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Resolving the Conflict Between 







In the early spring of 2013, Swarthmore College faculty met 
to discuss student demands that the school divest its holdings in 
companies that deal in fossil fuels.1  As a speaker began 
explaining how that decision would lose the school millions of 
dollars, student activists hijacked the meeting and silenced 
objectors.2  The activists’ behavior shows the emotion that 
sometimes pervades the issue of socially responsible investing, 
or “SRI” for short.  SRI is the practice of screening investments 
according to environmental, social, moral, and ethical criteria. 
Whether caretakers of other people’s money, such as trustees 
and financial advisers, ought to engage in SRI is frequently—
and sometimes heatedly—debated.  But to come to a correct 
conclusion, emotion cannot mask cold hard truth.  Trustees and 
advisers have legal obligations known as fiduciary duties,3 and 
these duties may prohibit SRI.  Much contemporary 
commentary on this topic is based on the premise that fiduciary 
duties do not stand athwart SRI,4 and thus tackles the issue 
from the standpoint of policy, asking “should a fiduciary engage 
 
* Post-graduate fellow in the Legal and Compliance Department of Christian 
Brothers Investment Services, Inc. B.A., Marquette University; J.D., magna 
cum laude, Ave Maria School of Law. I want to thank David Skelding for 
reading and commenting on a draft of this Article. 
1. See Thomas Sowell, Barbarians at the Campus Gates, NAT’L REV. 
ONLINE (May 21, 2013), 
http://www.nationalreview.com/article/348852/barbarians-campus-gates-
thomas-sowell. 
2. See id. (explaining how the activists seized the microphone and 
“shouted down a student who rose in the audience to object”). 
3. See infra note 13 and Part III.B. 
4. See, e.g., infra note 203 and accompanying text. 
1
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in SRI?”  However, this premise is wrong.  As this article shows, 
unless measures have been taken under certain legal doctrines, 
fiduciary duties absolutely do prevent SRI.  Unlike many other 
critiques on the subject, this article looks at SRI from a legal 
rather than political point of view, asking “may a fiduciary 
engage in SRI?” 
Part I of this article clarifies and strictly defines the 
frequently nebulous idea of SRI, explaining its history, trends, 
and current status.  To give perspective and perhaps temper 
hype, Part II discusses the efficacy of SRI as a method of change, 
concluding that while SRI may not have much effect on air 
quality or oppressive foreign governments,5 there are situations 
where SRI is useful and even necessary.  Part III looks at the 
conflict between SRI and the fiduciary duties of trustees, 
investment advisers, and broker-dealers.  It shows the 
contractual nature of fiduciary duties and why this is relevant 
for SRI.  Part III also explores important legislation, such as 
ERISA, that affects fiduciary duties in certain circumstances. 
Further, Part III examines the superficial and non-legal 
analysis in some of the high-profile commentary on SRI.  Part 
IV offers the legal analysis that has been lacking, examining SRI 
through the doctrines of authorization and ratification, as well 
as determining the effects of exculpation clauses in trust 
instruments and contracts.  The article concludes by explaining 
when SRI is lawful for fiduciaries and instructing them as to how 
they can engage in SRI without fear of breaching their fiduciary 
duties. 
 
A.  The Definition, History, and Current State of SRI 
 
The definition of SRI tends to change depending on who is 
speaking. However, to reach specific conclusions about SRI, it 
must have a specific definition. This part defines the term and 
explains why that definition is accurate. Then this part outlines 
the history of SRI, concluding with a description of its current 
state. 
 
5. It is important to note that while shareholder activism, such as 
shareholder resolutions, may affect corporate behavior, shareholder activism 
is not SRI, see infra note 11 and accompanying text, and is beyond the scope of 
this Article. 
2http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol35/iss2/2
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1. What Is SRI? 
 
Some commentators say that SRI has no strict definition,6 
yet at the same time admit that SRI may put a fiduciary at risk 
of being sued.7  Behavior that can lead to legal liability ought to 
have a firm definition so that people can be certain when they 
are or are not engaging in such behavior.  Loose definitions lead 
to sloppy thinking, which in turn leads to wrong conclusions 
about whether certain behavior is lawful.8  Furthermore, it is 
easy to define SRI with clarity and precision.  Professor John H. 
Langbein and Judge Richard A. Posner have already done so: 
SRI is “excluding the securities of certain otherwise attractive 
companies from an investor’s portfolio because the companies 
are judged to be socially irresponsible, and including the 
securities of certain otherwise unattractive companies because 
they are judged to be behaving in a socially laudable way.”9 
In other words, SRI is making an investment decision based 
on social, rather than financial, criteria.10  SRI is not 
shareholder activism (e.g., introducing a shareholder resolution) 
since SRI refers to the act of investing whereas activism occurs 
only after an investment is made.11  Nor is SRI the practice of 
 
6. See, e.g., Joel C. Dobris, SRI—Shibboleth or Canard (Socially 
Responsible Investing, That Is), 42 REAL PROP. PROB. & TR. J. 755, 756 n.4 
(2008) (stating that SRI has no strict definition and that its definition is 
disputed). 
7. See, e.g., id. at 760 (“When can a fiduciary take extra risk, in all 
likelihood by screening out unloved assets, and not get successfully sued?”). 
8. See e.g., discussion infra Part III.D. 
9. John H. Langbein & Richard A. Posner, Social Investing and the Law 
of Trusts, 79 MICH. L. REV. 72, 73 (1980). Implicit in this definition are two sub-
types of SRI, often called “negative” and “affirmative.” See JOAKIM SANDBERG, 
THE ETHICS OF INVESTING: MAKING MONEY OR MAKING A DIFFERENCE? 28–30 
(2008). Negative screening occurs when the investor avoids investing in a 
company for social or ethical reasons, whereas affirmative screening happens 
when the investor decides to invest in a company because of social or ethical 
criteria. See id. However, distinguishing between these two types of SRI is 
unnecessary for purposes of this article, because fiduciary duties apply 
regardless of whether a fiduciary screens negatively or affirmatively; and in 
both cases, the fiduciary uses social rather than financial criteria in deciding 
whether or not to invest. 
10. See Michael Knoll, Ethical Screening in Modern Financial Markets: 
The Conflicting Claims Underlying Socially Responsible Investment, 57 BUS. 
LAW. 681, 689 (2002). 
11. See, e.g., id. at 691 (“SRI should . . . be distinguished from shareholder 
3
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examining social and political factors to determine how those 
factors will influence the investment financially.12  For example, 
if a trustee decides to invest trust funds in a company because 
that company has good environmental policies and the trustee 
believes that those policies will result in profit for the company 
and strong financial return for the trust, this is not SRI.  But 
why is this not SRI, given that the decision was based on the 
company’s environmental policies?  The answer is that the 
fiduciary duty of care, which requires fiduciaries to make 
prudent investment decisions for the good of the beneficiaries, 
would likely compel the trustee to make that same decision 
anyway based on the fact that it is a financially prudent choice.13 
In fact, it is pointless to discuss whether a fiduciary may decide 
to invest (or not) according to environmental criteria if those 
criteria determine the investment’s financial aspect—that 
question is easily answered, and the answer is yes.14  Real SRI 
occurs when a fiduciary makes an investment decision based on 
criteria wholly separate from the investment’s financial aspects. 
For instance, when a fiduciary decides to avoid investing in a 
company—despite its promise of profit—solely because the 
company produces fossil fuels or has no women in management 
 
activism . . . . Buying one share of Philip Morris and seeking to place a 
shareholder resolution on the ballot directing the company to stop producing 
cigarettes . . . might be socially responsible, but it is not [SRI].”). 
12. See id. (“SRI should . . . be distinguished from the practice of 
examining socially and politically charged factors that might impact on 
financial soundness . . . .”). 
13. This article explains fiduciary duties in depth in Part III.B, but here 
is a basic explanation: A fiduciary has two fundamental duties, those of loyalty 
and care. See Robert Cooter & Bradley J. Freedman, The Fiduciary 
Relationship: Its Economic Character and Legal Consequences, 66 N.Y.U. L. 
REV. 1045, 1047 (1991) (“[M]isappropriation . . . is governed by the duty of 
loyalty, and . . . negligent mismanagement . . . is governed by the duty of care.”). 
The duty of loyalty requires the fiduciary to act in the best interest of the 
beneficiary or client at all times, prohibiting behavior such as self-dealing or 
usurping business opportunities. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 
78 cmts. c–d (2007); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY §§ 8.01–8.06 (2006); 
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 170 (1959). The duty of care requires the 
fiduciary to act prudently to make sound investment decisions that maximize 
the beneficiary’s or client’s income, meaning that a fiduciary must take 
financial considerations into account when making investment decisions. See, 
e.g., RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 77 (2007); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF 
AGENCY § 8.08 (2006); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 174 (1959). 
14. See supra note 13 and accompanying text; see also infra note 15. 
4http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol35/iss2/2
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positions, this is SRI.  Of course, it is possible that acting in the 
beneficiary’s best interest may result in a socially responsible 
investment, but that would not be SRI.15  Failure to grasp this 
leads to the mistake of thinking that the duty of care can 
actually compel SRI.16  The criteria underlying true SRI are 
unrelated to the beneficiary’s financial interest; therefore, 
fiduciary duties can never force SRI,17 though they may prevent 
it. 
 
B. The History and Current State of SRI 
 
Though SRI may be “in fashion,”18 it has existed at least as 
early as the nineteenth century.19  Originally, it was a practice 
 
15. See James D. Hutchinson & Charles G. Cole, Legal Standards 
Governing Investment of Pension Assets for Social and Political Goals, 124 U. 
PA. L. REV. 1340, 1345 (1980). 
 
It may be that labor-relations practices, compliance with 
environmental or safety standards, or other policies could 
affect the financial stability and profitability of a company 
whose securities are being analyzed. If the fiduciary 
performing the financial analysis of the investment activity 
has a sound empirical basis for considering these factors, 
then their use is defensible on purely financial grounds. The 
fiduciary does not override basic financial investment 
considerations for the sake of a social objective, nor does he 
temper judgments on comparable alternatives by focusing on 
noninvestment factors. The question of ‘social investing’ 
never arises in this setting, and we need not confuse the legal 
analysis applicable to ‘social investing’ by belaboring such 
practices.   
Id. 
16. See, e.g., infra note 201 and accompanying text. 
17. However, there may be a situation, as explained in Part IV.A, where 
a fiduciary is under a contractual, rather than fiduciary, duty to conduct SRI. 
18. Dobris, supra note 6, at 767. 
19. See Knoll, supra note 10, at 684. Professor Knoll cites evidence of 
Quakers practicing SRI as early as the 17th century. Id. at 684 n.17 (citing 
Amy L. Domini, What Is Social Investing? Who Are Social Investors?, in THE 
SOCIAL INVESTMENT ALMANAC 6 (Peter D. Kinder et al. 1992); ANNE SIMPSON, 
THE GREENING OF GLOBAL INVESTMENT: HOW THE ENVIRONMENT, ETHICS AND 
POLITICS ARE RESHAPING STRATEGIES 27 (1991)). Professor Knoll also cites 
Biblical injunctions against usury, id. at 684 (citing Exodus 22:25; 
Deuteronomy 23:16), but these passages do not concern SRI since they are 
about limitations on profit rather than investing for the purpose of social 
change. 
5
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of Christian investors who avoided putting their money into 
activities they considered sinful, such as alcohol and 
pornography.20  The first publicly-offered SRI fund was the 
Pioneer Fund, established in 1928.21  Like the earlier Christian 
investors, the Pioneer Fund screened investments from “sin 
industries.”22  SRI remained a seldom-used method of keeping 
one’s money out of the devil’s hands, until the 1960s when the 
Vietnam War prompted nationwide protest.23  Much like their 
ideological progeny at Swarthmore,24 student war protesters 
called for universities to divest their portfolios of defense 
industry stocks.25  A handful of mainstream SRI funds appeared 
within the next few years.26  Social investing became widespread 
with the western outcry for the abolition of apartheid in South 
Africa in the 1980s.27  By 1993, $625 billion in investments was 
screened, and nearly all of this was for the purpose of causing 
change in South Africa.28  Once that country’s segregation laws 
were repealed, the amount of screened investments fell by nearly 
75%.29  It was not long, however, before more people found 
reasons to screen more of their investments.  By 1999, the money 
in SRI was almost a trillion and a half dollars, with tobacco 
 
20. Id. at 684. See also Benjamin J. Richardson, Putting Ethics into 
Environmental Law: Fiduciary Duties for Ethical Investment, 46 OSGOODE 
HALL L.J. 243, 245 (2008) (“[T]he SRI movement began in the anti-slavery 
campaign of the Quakers in the 1700s.”). 
21. Knoll, supra note 10, at 684. 
22. Id. The Pioneer Fund exists today in the form of Pioneer Investments, 
though its mission statement highlights its innovative global investment 
management and does not refer to Christian screening. Pioneer’s Mission, 
PIONEER INVESTMENTS, 
http://us.pioneerinvestments.com/about/corp/mission.jsp?navid=189&navvr=1
78 (last visited Mar. 24, 2014). 
23. See Knoll, supra note 10, at 684; Richardson, supra note 20, at 249. 
24. See supra note 1. 
25. See Knoll, supra note 10, at 684. 
26. See id. at 684–85 (referring to the Pax World Fund, which screened 
weapons producers, and the Third Century Fund, which invested in companies 
sensitive to the environment and their local communities). 
27. See id. at 685; see also Bd. of Trs. of the Employees’ Ret. Sys. of Balt. 
v. Mayor & City Council of Balt., 562 A.2d 720 (Md. 1989) (determining the 
legality of city ordinance prohibiting city pension from investing in South 
African securities). 
28. See Knoll, supra note 10, at 685. 
29. Id. at 686. 
6http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol35/iss2/2
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screens comprising 96% of the total.30 
Today, over a thousand investment firms have signed the 
Principles for Responsible Investment,31 a set of six tenets 
committing signatories to certain environmental, social, and 
corporate governance considerations when making investment 
decisions.32  These firms manage assets totaling over $30 
trillion—about 20% of the total value of global capital markets.33 
At the end of 2012, $3.374 trillion of assets in the U.S. were 
invested according to socially responsible criteria, a nearly five-
fold increase from 1995.34  And SRI is not just for private 
investors.  The California Public Employees’ Retirement System 
(“CalPERS”)—the largest public pension fund in the U.S., with 
about $260 billion in its coffers35—proudly asserts its use of 
social and environmental standards when making investment 
decisions.36  It is evident that many investors admire and use 
 
30. Id. Besides tobacco, “[t]he next most common screens [we]re for 
gambling, alcohol, and weapons.” 
31. US SIF FOUND., REPORT ON SUSTAINABLE AND RESPONSIBLE INVESTING 
TRENDS IN THE UNITED STATES 5 (2012), available at 
http://www.ussif.org/files/Publications/12_Trends_Exec_Summary.pdf. 
32. These principles are commitments to: (1) incorporate environmental, 
social, and corporate governance (“ESG”) issues into investment analyses and 
decisions; (2) incorporate ESG issues into active ownership policies and 
practices; (3) seek disclosure on ESG issues by the entities invested in; (4) 
promote the principles within the investment industry; (5) work with other 
signatories to more effectively implement the principles; and (6) report on 
activities and progress toward implementing the principles. PRINCIPLES FOR 
RESPONSIBLE INVESTMENT, THE SIX PRINCIPLES, http://www.unpri.org/about-
pri/the-six-principles/ (last visited Mar. 24, 2014). Note that the second 
principle refers to shareholder activism, not SRI. Also, some argue that the fact 
that these principles are heavily subscribed to is unimportant since the 
principles are vague and do not require specific action. See, e.g., Richardson, 
supra note 20, at 257, 266. 
33. US SIF FOUND., supra note 31, at 5. 
34. Id. at 11. However, it is worth noting that this amount represents 
about 11% of the total assets under management, see id., which is just a small 
increase from 1999 when “one out of every eleven dollars in assets under 
management was invested using ethical screening.” Knoll, supra note 10, at 
686. 
35. Press Release, CalPERS, CalPERS Receives Commendation for Best 
Responsible Investment Report (June 12, 2013), 
https://www.calpers.ca.gov/index.jsp?bc=/about/newsroom/news/2013/responsi
ble- investment.xml. 
36. See, e.g., CALPERS, TOWARDS SUSTAINABLE INVESTMENT: TAKING 
RESPONSIBILITY 21 (2012), available at 
http://www.calpers.ca.gov/eip-docs/about/press/news/invest-corp/esg-report-
7
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SRI.  However, before taking its virtues for granted, it is worth 
examining the effects of SRI on social issues and investors’ 
money. 
 
II. The Effect of SRI on Investments and Social Issues 
 
CalPERS claims that 66% of every dollar it pays in benefits 
is derived from investments.37  But CalPERS fails to mention 
that California taxpayers guarantee the fund and pay the 
difference when the fund’s investments fail to yield sufficient 
returns.38  And despite CalPERS’s ballyhoo about the financial 
benefits of SRI, investment failure is rampant in the fund and is 
often a direct result of SRI.  For example, CalPERS divested its 
tobacco holdings;39 tobacco shares then rose and CalPERS 
missed $1 billion in profits.40  The fund’s decision to avoid 
investing in countries with poor labor records, like China, cost 
about $400 million.41  Investments in clean energy yielded the 
fund a return of negative 9.7%, though CalPERS’s chief 
investment officer, Joseph Dear, did note that it was “a noble 
way to lose money.”42 
Some believe that SRI can never be more than a losing bet, 
and that the only value in it at all is “consumptive”43—the 
satisfaction in having promoted a noble cause.  Professor 
Langbein and Judge Posner believe that social investing is 
undesirable because it loses money, and it does not create the 
change it seeks.44  They illustrate this by using the 1980s boycott 
against South Africa as an example, showing the impossibility 
 
2012.pdf (stating that as of Sept. 30, 2011, CalPERS had $1.2 billion of 
exposure to the alternative energy sector). 
37. Id. at 2–3. CalPERS claims that the remaining 34% comes from 
CalPERS employees and members. 
38. See Steven Malanga, The Pension Fund That Ate California, CITY J. 
(Dec. 23, 2014), http://www.city-journal.org/2013/23_1_calpers.html. 
39. See id. 
40. See id. Overall, CalPERS’s returns have been in the bottom 1% of all 
large public pension funds in the past five years. 
41. See id. 
42. Losing with Clean Tech, WALL ST. J. (Mar. 25, 2013), 
http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424127887324557804578374980641257
340. 
43. Langbein & Posner, supra note 9, at 94–95. 
44. Id. at 96. 
8http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol35/iss2/2
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of causing change through SRI: Not only would firms with offices 
in South Africa have to be excluded, but also AT&T because it 
has phone lines there, and banks that honor South African 
checks, and any other business providing goods or services to 
that country, even indirectly.45 
Professor Michael Knoll claims that it is impossible for 
nonfinancial screening to change corporate behavior while 
remaining costless to the investor.46  In an efficient market, 
meaning one where the prices of securities accurately reflect 
their value, screening will prevent diversification47 and thus 
increase the investor’s risk.48  In an inefficient market, screening 
increases the risk that the investor will exclude an undervalued 
security, thereby missing an opportunity for profit.49 
Additionally, Knoll argues that the demand curve for stocks is 
horizontal, which means that screening out a stock does not 
affect its demand; therefore, other investors will simply 
purchase the shares that the screening investor did not.50  Like 
Langbein and Posner, Knoll challenges the alleged success of the 
South African boycott, arguing that it had no effect at all on 
repealing apartheid.51 
 
45. See id. at 87. 
46. Knoll, supra note 10, at 710–11. 
47. Diversifying securities is a method of reducing a portfolio’s risk. See 
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 90(b) (2007) (“In making and implementing 
investment decisions, the trustee has a duty to diversify the investments of the 
trust unless, under the circumstances, it is prudent not to do so.”); Benjamin 
J. Richardson, Do the Fiduciary Duties of Pension Funds Hinder Socially 
Responsible Investing?, 22 BANKING & FIN. L. REV. 145, 152 (2007) (“A fiduciary 
should avoid speculative and unduly risky investments and a diverse portfolio 
can minimize investment risk.”). 
48. See Knoll, supra note 10, at 693–98. 
49. Id. at 700–02 (stating that though it’s impossible to test, it stands to 
reason that “[a]dding a constraint can only hurt you.”). 
50. Id. at 706–08. Furthermore, some funds, such as the Vice Fund, 
purposefully invest in companies that SRI funds commonly screen out. See, 
e.g., Vice Fund, USA MUTUALS, http://www.vicefund.com/ (last visited Jan. 28, 
2014) (“The [Vice] Fund seeks to select well-performing stocks of tobacco, 
alcohol, gaming, and weapons/defense companies because we believe that these 
industries tend to thrive regardless of the economy as a whole.”). 
51. Knoll, supra note 10, at 710 (citing Siew Hong Teoh et al., The Effect 
of Socially Activist Investment Policies on the Financial Markets: Evidence from 
the South African Boycott, 72 J. BUS. 35, 63–68 (1999See also Robert Heinkel, 
Alan Kraus & Josef Zechner, The Effect of Green Investment on Corporate 
Behavior, 36 J. FIN. & QUALITATIVE ANALYSIS 431, 447 (2001) (arguing that 
9
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Though SRI may not cause social change, there is reason to 
believe that it is not necessarily harmful to a fund either. Just 
because it may reduce a portfolio’s diversity, almost all of the 
benefits of diversification come from the first twenty stocks, so 
screening that allows for at least a couple dozen stocks in 
sufficiently varied industries will likely not handicap a fund.52 
Additionally, there can be good reasons for social screening.  Its 
original practitioners never intended or expected their screening 
to alter the behavior of others.53  Rather, SRI was a way for 
investors to stay true to their principles of virtue and morality.54 
Many today still screen investments for this purpose.  Christian 
Brothers Investment Services, Inc. (“CBIS”) is one example. 
CBIS offers investment advisory services to Catholic institutions 
and uses Catholic social and moral teaching to screen its 
investments.55  Investors with CBIS seek to avoid contributing 
to, or benefitting from, investments in activities that violate the 
teachings of the Catholic Church, such as abortion and 
contraception.56  CBIS uses SRI as one means of pursuing this 
goal.57  Institutions adhering to strict moral codes often require 
SRI, and companies like CBIS provide them valuable services. 
It is situations such as this from which SRI arose and in which 
it remains useful today. 
Many funds, however, use SRI not for the sake of virtue 
alone, but instead claim that screening creates profit.  In spite 
of its own financial loss resulting from SRI, CalPERS couches its 
investment principles in terms of adherence to its fiduciary 
 
though 10% of invested funds are in SRI, that is not enough to change firms’ 
behavior). 
52. Knoll, supra note 10, at 697. See also Matthew Haigh & James 
Hazelton, Financial Markets: A Tool for Social Responsibility?, 52 J. BUS. 
ETHICS 59, 65 (2004) (stating that research indicates SRI funds “do not 
underperform their conventional counterparts.”); Alicia H. Munnell, Should 
Public Plans Engage in Social Investing?, CTR. FOR RETIREMENT RES. AT BOS. 
COLL., at 6 (2007), available at http://crr.bc.edu/wp-
content/uploads/2007/08/ib_7-12.pdf (“[A]n investor needs only 20–30 stocks to 
construct a fully diversified portfolio.”). 
53. See, e.g., Knoll, supra note 10, at 692. 
54. See, e.g., supra note 20 and accompanying text. 
55. CHRISTIAN BROTHERS INVESTMENT SERVICES, INC., 
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duty58 imposed by the California Constitution59 and the 
supposed financial benefits of SRI to the investor.60  Why 
mention the financial benefits of investing against global 
warming?  Is it not enough that CalPERS is taking steps to 
eliminate the threat?61  No, it is not enough.  For reasons 
explained in the next part, CalPERS has to claim that its social 
investing is based in profit for the fund, because otherwise such 
investing would be unlawful. 
 
III. The Conflict Between SRI and Fiduciary Duties 
 
The reason SRI is unlawful in some instances is that the 
person engaging in SRI may have a fiduciary duty not to so 
engage. This Part describes the contract theory of fiduciary 
duties and explains why it is the theory that most accurately 
describes how and why fiduciary duties arise. Then this Part 
explains what those duties require of fiduciaries who engage in 
SRI, namely trustees, investment advisers, and broker-dealers. 
Legislation may alter common-law fiduciary duties, and this 
Part highlights important instances where that has occurred 
with respect to SRI. Finally, this Part summarizes previous 
attempts to justify SRI in light of fiduciary duties, shows their 





58. See, e.g., CALPERS, supra note 36, at 2 (“CalPERS has a fiduciary 
duty, which is set out in the California Constitution.”). 
59. CAL. CONST. art. XVI § 17(a) (“The retirement board of a public pension 
or retirement system shall have the sole and exclusive fiduciary responsibility 
over the assets of the public pension or retirement system.”). 
60. See, e.g., CALPERS, supra note 36, at 20 (“[C]limate change could 
reduce global GDP by as much as 20 percent by 2050.”); id. at 22 (“Climate 
change could contribute as much as 10 percent to portfolio risk over the next 
20 years.”). Despite its insistence on SRI’s economic factors, CalPERS lets 
down its guard a bit when talking about the BP oil spill in the Gulf of Mexico 
in 2010, stating that as a major investor in BP, CalPERS was concerned 
because “it was not just a matter of environmental and social responsibility but 
also financial concern: BP shares hit a 14-year low in the wake of the 
Deepwater Horizon spill.” Id. at 24 (emphasis added). 
61. This article states no opinion as to whether global warming exists or 
is a threat. 
11
   
546 PACE LAW REVIEW Vol.  35:2 
A. The Nature of Fiduciary Duties 
 
The common law has recognized fiduciary duties since at 
least as far into the past as America’s founding. Contemporary 
scholars and judges argue about whether these duties are 
contractual in nature. If fiduciary duties are contractual, then 
they do not stand in the way of parties making agreements that 
allow what a fiduciary duty would otherwise prohibit. As this 
part will show, fiduciary duties are contractual, and the 
arguments against contract theory collapse in the face of 
evidence. 
 
1. The History and Contractual Character of Fiduciary 
Duties 
 
The word “fiduciary” comes from “fiducia,” the Latin word 
for “trust.”62  As a legal term of art, the word “fiduciary” has been 
used since the seventeenth century and refers to a person who 
acts for the benefit of another in “all matters within the scope of 
their relationship.”63  A fiduciary duty is one “of utmost good 
faith, trust, confidence, and candor owed by a fiduciary . . . to the 
beneficiary . . . ; a duty to act with the highest degree of honesty 
and loyalty toward another person and in the best interests of 
the other person.”64 
Common law has recognized the fiduciary relationship for 
centuries.65  Traces of it exist in the trust originating at the end 
of the Middle Ages.  The trust’s purpose was to circumvent 
feudal restrictions on land transfer.66  Those restrictions 
prevented landholders from transferring their land by will, and 
 
62. Benjamin J. Richardson, Fiduciary Relationships for Socially 
Responsible Investing: A Multinational Perspective, 48 AM. BUS. L.J. 597, 597 
(2011). See also 5 THE OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 878 (2d ed. 1989) (“In 
Rom[an] Law fiducia denoted the transfer of a right to a person subject to the 
obligation to transfer it again at some future time or on some condition being 
fulfilled.”). 
63. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 702 (9th ed. 2009) [hereinafter BLACK’S]. 
64. Id. at 581. 
65. See Cooter & Freedman, supra note 13, at 1045 (stating that fiduciary 
relationships have been recognized in American law for over 250 years). 
66. See John H. Langbein, The Contractarian Basis of the Law of Trusts, 
105 YALE L.J. 625, 632 (1995). 
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instead enforced primogeniture67 and taxes.68  Land was wealth 
in those days,69 and people who had it often had desires for it 
which differed from those of their feudal lords.  Rather than 
allowing one’s death to trigger the land-transfer laws, holders of 
land (“settlors”) could convey their real property during life to 
another (“trustee”) who would agree to transfer that property to 
a person of the settlor’s choice after the settlor’s death.70  The 
trustee’s only duty in those days was to convey the land.71  Over 
time, the trust evolved from a method of conveying land into a 
financial-management device.72  The modern-day trustee’s job is 
to actively manage trust assets.73  Active management means 
the contemporary trustee, unlike the ancient trustee, has 
discretion over those assets.  Along with this discretion comes 
the power to exploit.  To protect beneficiaries from a trustee’s 
nefarious acts, the law has developed fiduciary duties that 
require the trustee to act in the best interest of the beneficiaries 
and exercise care in managing the assets.74 
These days, trustees are far from the only entities with 
fiduciary duties.  Attorneys are fiduciaries to their clients; 
corporate directors are fiduciaries to their corporations; agents 
are fiduciaries to their principals; partners are fiduciaries to 
each other; and the list goes on.75  The specific requirements of 
these duties are different depending on the relationship.76  For 
 
67. Primogeniture is “[t]he common-law right of the firstborn son to 
inherit his ancestor’s estate, usu[ally] to the exclusion of younger siblings.” 
BLACK’S, supra note 63, at 1311. 
68. See Langbein, supra note 66, at 632. 
69. Id. 
70. Id. at 633. 
71. Id. at 640. 
72. Id. at 637. 
73. Id. at 637–38. To illustrate the colossal growth of the trust, consider 
the contract between the medieval trustees who were not paid for their troubles 
and a modern trustee such as Wells Fargo Bank. See also id. at 638–39. 
74. Id. at 642. 
75. See Scott FitzGibbon, Fiduciary Relationships Are Not Contracts, 82 
MARQ. L. REV. 303, 306–07 (1999) (citations omitted). The type of relationship 
that constitutes a fiduciary one may depend on the state. For example, some 
states consider oil field operators to be fiduciaries for owners. See id. at 308 
n.24 (citing Fransen v. Conoco, Inc., 64 F.3d 1481, 1487 (10th Cir. 1995) 
(dictum) (“The unit operator’s duty is fiduciary in nature.”)). 
76. See Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Contract and 
Fiduciary Duty, 36 J.L. & ECON. 425, 432–43 (1993). 
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example, a trustee’s duty of care to a beneficiary requires “a high 
degree of prudence,” whereas an attorney’s duty of care to a 
client is the ordinary negligence standard.77  That fiduciary 
obligations exist is certain, but there is debate about whether or 
not they are contractual in nature.78  Those who adhere to the 
contract theory believe that all fiduciary duties are negotiable, 
while those who oppose contract theory argue that there are 
certain bedrock fiduciary duties that cannot be waived.79  Who 
is correct is important for SRI because if, for example, a financial 
adviser’s duty of care cannot be contractually altered, then that 
adviser may not be able to engage in SRI on behalf of a client. 
Judge Frank Easterbrook and Professor Daniel Fischel are 
proponents of the contract theory.  They say that in spite of the 
moralizing language found in many court opinions discussing 
fiduciary duties,80 in reality the fiduciary relationship is not 
moral but contractual.81  Fiduciary duties arise when certain 
aspects of a contractual relationship are impossible—for reasons 
of cost and lack of knowledge—to specify.82  No contract can 
make provisions for every possible situation, and fiduciary 
duties arise when there is too great a distance between what 
parties are capable of providing for via contract and what 
 
77. Id. at 423. 
78. See Arthur B. Laby, The Fiduciary Obligation as the Adoption of Ends, 
56 BUFF. L. REV. 99, 100 (2008) (“Scholars of fiduciary duties have divided 
themselves into two warring camps.”). 
79. Id. at 100–01. 
80. Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 76, at 439 (quoting Meinhard v. 
Salmon, 164 N.E. 545, 546 (N.Y. 1928) (“A trustee is held to something stricter 
than the morals of the market place. Not honesty alone, but the punctilio of an 
honor the most sensitive, is then the standard of behavior.”)); see also id. at 
428 n.6 (citing Pepper v. Litton, 308 U.S. 295, 311 (1939); Guth v. Loft, Inc., 5 
A.2d 503, 510 (Del. 1939)). 
81. Id. at 427 (“Fiduciary duties are not special duties; they have no moral 
footing; they are the same sort of obligations, derived, and enforced in the same 
way, as other contractual undertakings.”). See also Paul B. Miller, A Theory of 
Fiduciary Liability, 56 MCGILL L.J. 235, 237 (2011) (suggesting that fiduciary 
liability “might be better understood as an outgrowth of contract [law].”). 
82. See, e.g., Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 76, at 426 (arguing that 
the duty of loyalty “is a response to the impossibility of writing contracts 
completely specifying the parties’ obligations.”).  “When one party hires the 
other’s knowledge and expertise, there is not much they can write down.”  Id.  
“A ‘fiduciary’ relation is a contractual one characterized by unusually high 
costs of specification and monitoring.” Id. at 427. 
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situations could occur.83  Consider the following agreement: A 
homeowner contracts with a painter for the painter to paint the 
homeowner’s house.  This transaction is fairly simple and nearly 
all relevant matters and contingencies—such as paint color, 
payment, deadline, acts of God—can be accounted for in the 
contract.  Now consider a contract between an investment 
adviser and client: The client contracts with the adviser for the 
adviser to invest the client’s money and maximize the income. 
This agreement is long-term, the client may have little ability to 
monitor the adviser, and outcome may be a bad measure of the 
adviser’s performance since luck could be a powerful factor.84 
Because there are so many possibilities that cannot be provided 
for in the contract, courts impose the fiduciary duties of loyalty 
and care onto the adviser as a way of allowing such an 
agreement to have value.85  Ignorance makes holes in 
contracts—fiduciary duties fill them. 
Easterbrook and Fischel use the often-cited Meinhard v. 
Salmon86 to illustrate their point.  In Meinhard, Salmon signed 
a twenty-year lease on a hotel.87  Meinhard paid for half of the 
hotel’s renovation and management and received a share of the 
profits.88  When the lease was a few months from ending, a third 
party offered Salmon nearly ten times the old rent.89  Salmon 
accepted the offer without first informing Meinhard.90  The court 
held that Salmon had had a duty to tell Meinhard about the offer 
before accepting it himself.91  Judge Cardozo claimed to base his 
 
83. Id. at 426. 
84. Id. 
85. Id. at 426–27 (“[L]egal rules can promote the benefits of contractual 
endeavors in a world of scarce information and high transaction costs by 
prescribing the outcomes the parties themselves would have reached had 
information been plentiful and negotiations costless.”) (citing R. H.  Coase, The 
Problem of Social Cost, 3. J.L. & ECON. 1 (1960)). Note that courts consider an 
adviser’s fiduciary duties to be codified in the Investors Advisers Act of 1940. 
See infra Part III.B.2. 
86. Meinhard v. Salmon, 164 N.E. 545 (N.Y. 1928). 
87. Id. at 545. 
88. Id. at 546. 
89. Id. 
90. Id. 
91. Id. at 547 (“The very fact that Salmon was in control with exclusive 
powers of direction charged him the more obviously with the duty of disclosure 
. . . .”). 
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opinion on a trustee’s “punctilio of an honor the most 
sensitive,”92 but Easterbrook and Fischel argue that the court 
was not driven by morality; rather, it was merely creating the 
contract it thought would have existed if bargaining costs had 
been lower.93 
Commentators have proposed numerous theories as to how 
fiduciary duties arise and what they require.94  However, 
contract theory is the best because it explains not only how 
fiduciary duties occur, but why—namely, to fill gaps in 
contracts.95  Many attack the theory, but close examination of 
their criticisms reveals that they are based on mirages.  The next 
few pages examine some of the most common arguments against 
 
92. Id. at 546. 
93. Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 76, at 440. 
94. See J.C. Shepherd, A Unified Concept of Fiduciary Relationships, 97 
L.Q. REV. 51 (1981) (describing several theories of how fiduciary duties arise). 
Unjust enrichment theory: “[A] fiduciary relationship exists where one person 
obtains property or other advantage which justice requires should belong to 
another person.” Id. at 53. Commercial utility theory: “[A] fiduciary 
relationship will be found . . . in every situation in which the court feels it 
necessarqy to hold a person or a certain class of persons to a higher than 
average standard of ethics or good faith in the interests of protecting the 
integrity of a commercial enterprise.” Id. at 56–57. Reliance theory: “[A] 
fiduciary relationship exists where one person reposes trust or confidence or 
reliance in another.” Id. at 58. Unequal relationship theory: “[A] fiduciary 
relationship exists wherever there is established an inequality of footing 
between the parties.” Id. at 61. Property theory: “[A] fiduciary relationship 
exists where one person has legal title and /or control over property or other 
advantage, and another is the beneficial owner thereof.” Id. at 63. Power and 
discretion theory: “[A] fiduciary relationship exists where one person has: (a) 
the power to change the legal position of another, and (b) a discretion in the 
exercise of that power.” Id. at 68. Shepherd’s theory: “A fiduciary relationship 
exists whenever any person receives a power of any type on condition that he 
also receive with it a duty to utilise [sic] that power in the best interests of 
another, and the recipient of the power uses that power.” Id. at 75. See also 
Laby, supra note 78, at 129–48 (arguing for a deontological theory based on 
Kantian ethics); D. Gordon Smith, The Critical Resource Theory of Fiduciary 
Duty, 55 VAND. L. REV. 1399, 1402 (2002) (“[F]iduciary relationships form when 
one party (the “fiduciary”) acts on behalf of another party (the “beneficiary”) 
while exercising discretion with respect to a critical resource belonging to the 
beneficiary.”). 
95. Note that there are those who admire Easterbrook’s and Fischel’s 
argument for contract theory and yet have perceived flaws in it. See, e.g., 
Roberta Romano, Comment on Easterbrook and Fischel, “Contract and 
Fiduciary Duty”, 36 J.L. & ECON. 447, 448 (1993) (arguing that Easterbrook 
and Fischel failed to give a sufficiently specific “economic theory of the 
contractual relations to which courts could apply fiduciary labels”). 
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contract theory, waving hands through their illusions and 
dispelling their clouds of confusion. 
 
2.  Debunking the Arguments Against Contract Theory 
 
One frequent criticism of contract theory is that it does not 
explain the existence of core fiduciary duties that cannot be 
altered by contract.96  Professor Arthur Laby describes a core 
duty as the fiduciary’s obligation to adopt the principal’s ends as 
the fiduciary’s own.97  Professor Robert Sitkoff says that a 
principal can never authorize a fiduciary to act in bad faith, thus 
making good faith a core duty.98  Professor Scott FitzGibbon 
gives as an example of a core duty the fact that even with client 
consent, attorneys cannot alter their duty to avoid conflicts of 
interest with clients.99  While all of these statements may be 
true, none of them supports the argument that fiduciary duties 
prevent parties from making agreements with regard to any 
specific behavior not otherwise illegal.  Put differently, core 
duties do not define an agreement; rather, an agreement defines 
core duties. 
As to Laby’s point, the fiduciary’s obligation to adopt the 
principal’s ends is no different from the obligations of a party to 
any contract.  That is, in fact, what contracts are: agreements 
under which one party adopts the ends of the other.100  Recall 
the prior hypothetical contracts, one between an investment 
adviser and client and the other between a homeowner and 
painter.101  The adviser adopts the client’s goal of profit and the 
painter adopts the homeowner’s objective of having the house 
 
96. See Laby, supra note 78, at 103; Robert H. Sitkoff, The Economic 
Structure of Fiduciary Law, 91 B.U. L. REV. 1039, 1046 (2011) (“Committed 
contractarians have had difficulty explaining why the parties to a fiduciary 
relationship do not have complete freedom of contract to alter the terms of that 
relationship.”). 
97. Laby, supra note 78, at 103. 
98. Sitkoff, supra note 96, at 1046. 
99. FitzGibbon, supra note 75, at 322 (“[A] lawyer’s duty to avoid certain 
conflicts of interest applies notwithstanding client consent to the conflict . . . 
.”). 
100. See, e.g., BLACK’S, supra note 63, at 365 (defining a contract as “[a]n 
agreement between two or more parties creating obligations that are 
enforceable or otherwise recognizable at law.”). 
101. See supra note 84 and accompanying text. 
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painted.  The reason the adviser-client contract includes default 
fiduciary duties is because by its nature, unlike the homeowner-
painter contract, it has many gaps.102  Default rules might apply 
to fill such gaps.103 Fiduciary duties are gap-fillers whose 
application depends on the contract’s terms and lack thereof.104 
Sitkoff’s argument is similarly weak.  Bad faith does not refer to 
specific behavior detached from any agreement.105  Rather, “bad 
faith” is a generic term given substance only by the contract 
itself.106  Therefore, while it may be true that a fiduciary can 
 
102. Id. 
103. See, e.g., Valentine v. Ormsbee Exploration Corp., 665 P.2d 452, 457 
(Wyo. 1983) (“‘[P]arties who contract on subject matter concerning which 
known usages prevail incorporate into the agreement such implications if 
nothing is said to the contrary.’” (quoting Engle v. First Nat’l Bank of 
Chugwater, 590 P.2d 826, 831 (Wyo. 1979)); Olberding Constr. Co., Inc. v. 
Ruden, 243 N.W.2d 872, 875 (Iowa 1976) (“[W]here there is no agreement as to 
the amount of compensation, the law implies a promise to pay reasonable 
compensation.” (citing Sitzler v. Peck, 162 N.W.2d 449, 451 (Iowa 1968)); Hunt 
v. First Nat’l Bank of Tampa, 381 So. 2d 1194, 1197 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1980) 
(using the following guidelines to determine what result parties intended 
under unanticipated circumstances: reasonable interpretation preferred to 
unreasonable one; interpretation leading to reasonable conclusion preferred to 
one leading to unreasonable conclusion; interpretation leading to fair result 
preferred to one leading to unfair result; interpretation rendering contract 
valid preferred to one rendering contract invalid). 
104. See Larry E. Ribstein, Fencing Fiduciary Duties, 91 B.U. L. REV. 899, 
906–07 (2011) (“Fiduciary duties are clearly created by contract in that one can 
decide whether to be a party to a relationship that includes these duties as a 
default term. The fact that fiduciary duties are imposed by default rule rather 
than by explicit agreement should not take them out of the contractual realm, 
anymore than default rules are inconsistent with contracts in myriad other 
settings.”). 
105. See BLACK’S, supra note 63, at 159 (defining bad faith as “[d]ishonesty 
of belief or purpose . . . .”). 
106. See, e.g., Huang v. BP Amoco Corp., 271 F.3d 560, 565 (3d Cir. 2001) 
(holding that the lower court’s determination that defendant acted in good 
faith was based on that court’s erroneous interpretation of the contract); Grand 
Light & Supply Co., Inc. v. Honeywell, Inc., 771 F.2d 672, 679 (2d Cir. 1985) 
(“The U.C.C. good faith provision may not be used to override explicit 
contractual terms.”) (citing Corenswet, Inc. v. Amana Refrigeration, Inc., 594 
F.2d 129, 138 (5th Cir. 1979)); Sawyer v. Guthrie, 215 F. Supp. 2d 1254, 1262–
63 (D. Wyo. 2002) (refusing to imply, under the duty of good faith, a contractual 
provision requiring defendant to drill oil to prevent expiration of leases when 
no such provision existed); Oil Express Nat’l, Inc. v. Burgstone, 958 F. Supp. 
366, 369–70 (N.D. Ill. 1997) (holding that counter-plaintiffs sufficiently stated 
claim for bad faith by alleging counter-defendant had broad discretion under 
the contract to perform certain acts and failed to perform those acts in a 
reasonable manner); Seidenberg v. Summit Bank, 791 A.2d 1068, 1076 (N.J. 
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never act in bad faith, in practice this could not prohibit an 
agreement from allowing any specific act since the agreement 
itself determines what bad faith is.  As for attorneys, unless a 
state’s attorney-ethics rules state otherwise,107 attorneys and 
clients can in fact waive the prohibition against conflicts of 
interest.108 
Another criticism of contract theory is that it does not 
adequately describe the fiduciary relationship.  Laby notes that 
there are instances of high specification and monitoring costs 
where no fiduciary relationship arises,109 as well as times where 
parties have drafted detailed contracts and yet courts have 
found fiduciary relationships anyway.110  One example he gives 
of where fiduciary duties should arise—but do not—if contract 
theory were correct is in the case of securities brokerage.111 
However, brokers do in fact have a fiduciary duty to their clients 
for the duration of the transaction;112 and when brokers act as 
advisers, the fiduciary duties of advisers apply to them as 
well.113  As for cases where courts have supposedly found 
fiduciary duties despite detailed contracts—some of which 
explicitly disclaim fiduciary duties—none of the cases Laby cites 
to actually support the argument that fiduciary duties compel or 
forbid certain behavior in the face of a contractual provision to 
 
Super. Ct. App. Div. 2002) (stating that the parole evidence rule does not 
prevent testimony regarding claims of bad faith since the purpose of the duty 
of good faith is “the enhanced status of the parties’ reasonable expectations.”). 
But see Wakefield v. N. Telecom, Inc., 769 F.2d 109 (2d Cir. 1985) (holding that 
plaintiff may show employer’s bad faith if employer fired plaintiff to avoid 
paying commissions, though employment contract explicitly said commissions 
would only be paid if plaintiff were employed on date of payment). 
107. See, e.g., Judith A. McMarrow, Rule 11 and Federalizing Lawyer 
Ethics, 1991 BYU L. REV. 959, 959 (stating that state courts have traditionally 
“been the primary source for regulating lawyers and articulating standards of 
legal ethics.”); Eli J. Richardson, Demystifying the Federal Law of Attorney 
Ethics, 29 GA. L. REV. 137, 140 n.2 (1994) (discussing how lawyers and judges 
have written attorney-ethics rules).  See also infra Part III.C (describing how 
statutes can affect and erase fiduciary duties). 
108. See, e.g., infra notes 114–116 and accompanying text. 
109. Laby, supra note 78, at 110–12 (giving examples such as securities 
brokerage and auditors). 
110. Id. at 113 n.51 (citations omitted). 
111. Id. at 111. 
112. See infra note 161 and accompanying text. 
113. See infra note 163 and accompanying text. 
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the contrary.  An examination of those cases actually shows the 
opposite to be true.  For example, in Victory Lane Productions, 
LLC v. Paul Hastings, Janofsky & Walker, LLP,114 the plaintiffs 
sued their law firm for representing them while concealing from 
them a conflict of interest—a breach of the firm’s fiduciary duty. 
Rather than holding that such a conflict was strictly forbidden, 
the court said an attorney could defend against the claim by 
showing that the transaction was fair, the client voluntarily 
entered into it, and the client fully understood its nature.115  This 
principle agrees with contract theory since it would allow an 
attorney and client to contract around a conflict of interest.116 
Though Laby cites the Second Restatement of Trusts to 
counter Langbein’s argument that settlors can alter nearly all 
trust rules by trust provision,117 a close reading shows that it 
does not actually claim that fiduciary duties prohibit settlors 
from making specific provisions which are legal in all other 
respects. In fact, the Second Restatement hurts the anti-
contractarian argument rather than helps it.  Laby cites section 
 
114. 409 F. Supp. 2d 773, 775 (S.D. Miss. 2006). The alleged conflict of 
interest arose from the defendant having represented both the plaintiff and 
another party against the same third party.  Id. The defendant was trying to 
collect money from the third party on behalf of both clients, but the third party 
had limited funds, thus making it impossible for the defendant to represent 
one client without detriment to the other.  Id. at 776. 
115. Id. at 781 (citing Tyson v. Moore, 613 So. 2d 817, 823–24 (Miss. 
1992)). 
116. For his proposition that courts find fiduciary duties in spite of 
detailed contracts that disclaim fiduciary duties, Laby also cites the following 
cases, though these cases do not support Laby’s claim: Global Entm’t, Inc. v. 
N.Y. Tel. Co., No. 00-CV-02959, 2000 WL 1672327, at *6 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 6, 
2000) (stating “A fiduciary duty must be separate and beyond any contractual 
duties”; but not stating or implying that fiduciary duties cannot be negated by 
contract); April Enters., Inc. v. KTTV, 195 Cal. Rptr. 421, 428 (Cal. Ct. App. 
1983) (stating that joint ventures can be created by parties’ conduct despite a 
contract labeling the relationship as something else, but not stating or 
implying that it is not the contract that determines parties’ conduct); Singleton 
v. Stegall, 580 So. 2d 1242, 1244 (Miss. 1991) (stating that an attorney is bound 
by the duties of care, loyalty, and those stipulated by contract; however, parties 
in this case did not attempt to contractually waive any fiduciary duties and 
court does not say parties would have been prevented from doing so). See Laby, 
supra note 78, at 113 n.51. 
117. Laby, supra note 78, at 119–22. 
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222(2)118 and comment c(2) of section 78119 as evidence that the 
duty of loyalty is non-negotiable.120  While those sections do 
indeed say that a trust provision cannot relieve a trustee of 
liability for breaches of trust done intentionally or in bad faith, 
the trust instrument itself (as with contracts, as shown above) 
determines what bad faith is.121  In fact, comment c of section 
222(2) says that trust terms specifically allowing a trustee to 
engage in otherwise prohibited behavior or relieving the trustee 
from engaging in otherwise necessary behavior are valid.122 
Laby cites section 174123 for the proposition that while the 
duty of care can be modified, it cannot be eliminated.124  But as 
with section 222(2), this does not mean that there are certain 
otherwise prohibited or required behaviors that cannot be 
waived by explicit provision in the trust.  Case law shows this to 
 
118. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) TRUSTS § 222(2) (1959) (“A provision in the 
trust instrument is not effective to relieve the trustee of liability for breach of 
trust committed in bad faith or intentionally or with reckless indifference to 
the interest of the beneficiary . . . .”). 
119. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) TRUSTS § 78 cmt. c(2) (1959) (“[N]o matter 
how broad the provisions of a trust may be in conferring power to engage in 
self-dealing or other transactions involving a conflict of fiduciary and personal 
interests, a trustee violates the duty of loyalty . . . by acting in bad faith or 
unfairly.”). 
120. Laby, supra note 78, at 119–22. 
121. See, e.g., Nelson v. First Nat’l Bank and Trust Co. of Williston, 543 
F.3d 432, 436–37 (8th Cir. 2008) (holding trustee acted in good faith despite 
holding allegedly risky stocks because the trust instrument specifically allowed 
trustee to hold such stocks and trustee did not act “dishonestly or with corrupt 
or selfish motives”); Marsh v. Greyhound Lines, Inc., 488 F.2d 278, 282–83 (5th 
Cir. 1974) (holding that trustee did not act in bad faith in denying appellee’s 
disability benefits trust since the trust instrument required information 
establishing permanent disability and appellee failed to supply such 
information); see also supra note 106. 
122. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 222(2) cmt. c (1959): 
 
If by the terms of the trust it is provided that the trustee shall 
not be under any duty to do or to refrain from doing an act 
which but for such provision it would be the duty of the 
trustee to do or refrain from doing, the trustee does not 
commit a breach of trust in doing or failing to do the act . . . . 
 
123. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 174 (1959) (“The trustee is under 
a duty to the beneficiary in administering the trust to exercise such care and 
skill as a man of ordinary prudence would exercise in dealing with his own 
property . . . .”). 
124. See Laby, supra note 78, at 121. 
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be true.  For example, in First National Bank of Chicago v. A.M. 
Castle & Co. Employee Trust,125 the court invoked section 174 in 
holding that it was a question of fact whether a bank fiduciary 
breached its duty by failing to honor an investor’s request for 
asset withdrawal within the one-year limit stipulated in the 
trust instrument.   This decision was based on the deadline in 
the trust, which was set by the settlor, and the settlor could have 
set a different deadline or no deadline.126   It is only reasonable 
that a generic trust provision dissolving the duty of loyalty or 
care would not be upheld, because if it were then the trustee 
could flout all duties and there would be no trust agreement at 
all.  Essentially, these Restatement provisions merely say that 
the trust instrument can allow the trustee any behavior127 as 
long as it does so with a clear and explicit provision. 
In essence, fiduciary duties are tools for filling gaps in 
contracts.   One difference between contract theory and the anti-
contractarian theories is that contract theory explains why 
courts fill such gaps and the others concentrate on how courts 
fill them.128  Conflating the “how” with the “why” leads to the 
anti-contractarian mistake of believing that the existence of a 
gap-filling method automatically necessitates its use, even when 
there are no gaps to fill.  But on a deep level, perhaps in some 
cases verging into the sub-conscience, the underlying principles 
guiding opposition to contract theory are not based on law, but 
rather on morality.  Anti-contractarians take issue with the 
notion that contract theory reduces ethics and morals to 
contractual arrangement.  For example, Laby dislikes the fact 
 
125. 180 F.3d 814, 817 (7th Cir. 1999). 
126. Id. See also Chao v. Malkani, 452 F.3d 290, 294 (4th Cir. 2006) 
(holding that plan administrator violated fiduciary duties by contradicting 
plan’s “plain language”); Dunkley v. Peoples Bank & Trust Co., 728 F. Supp. 
547, 563 (W.D. Ark. 1989) (holding that trustee breached duty of care by 
making distributions in violation of the trust instrument, but stating that 
those distributions could have been lawful had the trust instrument said so).  
But see A.M. Castle, 180 F.3d at 817 (stating in dicta that an emergency 
situation could have given the bank the right to breach the one-year deadline 
if adherence to the deadline “would have made the investors as a whole worse 
off . . . .”). 
127. This excludes behavior against public policy, i.e., illegal behavior 
outside the realm of fiduciary duties.  For example, a trust provision directing 
a trustee to invest in illegal drugs would be unenforceable. 
128. See, e.g., supra note 94. 
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that contract theory suggests there is nothing “unique or special” 
about fiduciary duties.129   (Incidentally, Easterbrook and 
Fischel agree with Laby on this entirely.130)  But why would it 
be desirable for fiduciary duties to be “special” and what would 
that even mean?131  Likely, anti-contractarians are bothered by 
the fact that when the frills of moral finery are stripped away, 
mankind’s fundamental goal of efficient economic gain is 
exposed, making contract-theory uncomfortably honest.  But 
honesty is itself a virtue, and when it comes to fiduciary duties, 
being honest about what they are makes it easier for people to 
contract for what they want, like SRI. 
 
B. What Fiduciary Duties Require of Trustees, Investment 
Advisers, and Broker-Dealers 
 
This part concerns three types of fiduciaries who might 
engage in SRI on behalf of another: trustees, investment 
advisers, and broker-dealers.132  The fiduciary duties of each 
come from different sources and their requirements vary 
depending on the fiduciary’s activity.  To determine how each 
type of fiduciary can perform SRI without breaching their duties, 
these duties must be defined. 
 
129. Laby, supra note 78, at 109. 
130. Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 76, at 438 (stating that scholars 
looking for a non-economic explanation for fiduciary duties cannot find one 
because “[t]hey are looking for something special about fiduciary relations.  
There is nothing special to find.”). 
131. Maybe the confusion stems, as Langbein suggests, from the fact that 
trusts originated in courts of equity rather than in courts of common law, 
where contract law developed.  Langbein, supra note 66, at 632–49. Langbein 
explains that trusts were kept in courts of equity because common-law courts 
were not fact-finding and did not allow testimony.  Id. at 635–36.  This also 
helped to hide from the king the revenue he was missing as a result of his 
subjects avoiding the feudal land laws.  Id. at 634 n.41.  However, given the 
many years that have passed since the merging of courts of law and equity, 
this is unlikely the source of modern-day puzzlement.  See Eric J. Hamilton, 
Note, Federalism and the State Civil Jury Rights, 65 STAN. L. REV. 851, 861 
(2013) (claiming that states began merging their courts of law and equity in 
the mid-19th century, though 4 states—Deleware, Mississippi, New Jersey, 
Tennessee—still maintain separate courts). 
132. Note that with regard to finance committee members and directors 
of entities, if they operate under a trust instrument then their duties, powers, 
and abilities to engage in SRI when investing trust funds are analyzed under 
the same rules as those of trustees. 
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1. Trustees 
 
A trustee is a person who holds legal title to property for the 
benefit of another person.133  Trustees have two general fiduciary 
duties: care and loyalty.134  These duties exist to ensure trustees 
put their best effort into managing the trust and do so with the 
objectives of the trust in mind.135  The duty of care requires 
trustees to follow the Prudent Investor Rule.136  This rule 
imposes on trustees the duty to invest and manage the assets of 
the trust as would a prudent investor.137  As mentioned, this 
includes a duty to diversify investments unless diversification 
would be unwise.138  Trustees must carefully investigate 
opportunities and relevant information before making a 
decision, and have reasonable grounds for whatever decision 
they make.139  Trustees who hold themselves out as having 
special expertise in the area of finance and investments must 
use this expertise in managing their trusts.140  Trustees may 
delegate trust-management tasks to third parties, but they must 
 
133. See BLACK’S, supra note 63, at 1656. 
134. See, e.g., supra note 13. 
135. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 90 cmt. d (2007) (“The 
duty of care requires the trustee to exercise reasonable effort and diligence in 
making and monitoring investments for the trust, with attention to the trust’s 
objectives.”); id. § 78(1) (“Except as otherwise provided in the terms of the trust, 
a trustee has a duty to administer the trust solely in the interest of the 
beneficiaries . . . .”). 
136. The Prudent Investor Rule governs the investment of trust funds, 
and its roots can be traced back to Harvard College v. Amory. 26 Mass. (9 Pick.) 
446 (1830).  See Arthur B. Laby, Fiduciary Obligations of Broker-Dealers and 
Investment Advisers, 55 VILL. L. REV. 701, 717 n.94 (2010) [hereinafter 
Fiduciary Obligations].  Amory said that trustees should manage their trust 
as would a prudent man, “not in regard to speculation, but in regard to the 
permanent disposition of their funds . . . .” 26 Mass. (9 Pick.) at 461.  This came 
to be known as the Prudent Man Rule.  See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS 
pt. 6, ch. 17, intro. note (2007).  However, the Prudent Man Rule’s classification 
of certain categories of investments as “speculative,” and thus imprudent, 
caused increasing criticism of the Rule.  See id. In response to these criticisms, 
the Prudent Investor Rule arose “to modernize trust investment law and to 
restore the generality and flexibility of the original doctrine.”  Id. 
137. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 90 (2007). 
138. See supra note 47. 
139. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 90 cmt. d (2007). 
140. Id. (“[I]f the trustee possesses a degree of skill greater than that of 
an individual of ordinary intelligence, the trustee is liable for a loss that results 
from failure to make reasonably diligent use of that skill.”). 
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act prudently in delegating authority and choosing and 
monitoring such agents.141  The unifying purpose of these 
aspects of the duty of care is to maximize the financial 
performance of the trust in accord with the trust’s provisions and 
stated purpose.142 
The duty of loyalty requires trustees to manage their trusts 
in the sole interests of the beneficiaries.143  Thus, unless 
authorized by the trust instrument or a court, trustees may not 
themselves deal with the trust.144  This prohibition is so strict 
that, even if a trustee can demonstrate that such a transaction 
was done in good faith, under fair terms, and without profit to 
the trustee, the trustee will still have breached the duty of 
loyalty.145  Naturally, this duty also prohibits the trustee from 
administering the trust in the interest of non-beneficiaries,146 
which is particularly relevant with regard to SRI. 
 
2. Investment Advisers 
 
Investment advisers are regulated by the federal 
Investment Advisers Act of 1940 (“IAA”).147  This was the final 
act in a series passed to regulate the securities industry and 
prevent behavior Congress considered to have contributed to the 
1929 stock market crash and the Great Depression.148  The IAA 
defines an investment adviser as a person who, for 
compensation, advises others as to the value or advisability of 
investing in securities.149  Sections 206(1) and (2) prohibit 
 
141. Id. § 90(c)(2). 
142. Id. pt. 6, ch. 17, intro. note (2007) (explaining how the rise of modern 
portfolio theory engendered the more flexible Prudent Investor Rule so as to 
better take advantage of modern investment techniques and theories). 
143. Id. § 90 cmt. c.(“The strict duty of loyalty . . . prohibits the trustee 
from investing or managing trust investments in a manner that will give rise 
to a personal conflict of interest.”). 
144. See id. § 78(2). 
145. Id. § 78 cmt. b (explaining the “no further inquiry” principle). 
146. Id. § 78 cmt. f (“[T]he trustee has a duty to the beneficiaries not to be 
influenced by the interest of any third person or by motives other than the 
accomplishment of the purposes of the trust.”). 
147. Investment Advisers Act of 1940, 15 U.S.C. §§ 80b-1–21 (2012). 
148. See SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, Inc., 375 U.S. 180, 186 
(1963). 
149. 15 U.S.C. § 80b-2(a)(11). 
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investment advisers from defrauding or deceiving clients or 
prospective clients.150  Section 206(3) requires the adviser to 
inform clients of when their purchase or sale of a security will 
benefit the adviser’s own account or the account of another client 
of the adviser.151  The first case to interpret Sections 206(1) and 
(2) of the IAA was SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, Inc.152  
This case is often cited for the proposition that the IAA imposed 
a fiduciary duty on financial advisers, and the SEC still relies on 
it in enforcement actions.153 
Capital Gains appeared to follow trust law in its analysis of 
the adviser’s duties.154  Like a trustee to a beneficiary, the 
financial adviser must act in the best interest of the client.155  
Part of acting in the client’s best interest is fully disclosing all 
actual and potential conflicts of interest to the client.156  Much of 
 
150. Id. § 80b-6(1) & (2). 
151. Id. § 80b-6(3). 
152. 375 U.S. 180 (1963).. 
153. See Arthur B. Laby, SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bureau and the 
Investment Advisers Act of 1940, 91 B.U. L. REV. 1051, 1052–53 (2011). Laby 
argues that Capital Gains did not actually hold that the IAA created a 
fiduciary duty for advisers; rather, subsequent cases “misread or simply 
disregarded” Capital Gains. Id. at 1053. Rather than holding that the IAA 
created a fiduciary duty for advisers, Laby argues the Court believed that 
Congress recognized such a duty existed before the IAA. Id. at 1066. Though 
Capital Gains never said that the IAA created fiduciary duties, Santa Fe 
Indus. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462, 471 n.11 (1977) claimed that Capital Gains did 
just that. However, the IAA never describes advisers as fiduciaries, and 
previous versions of that Act which did were voted down. Id. at 1069–70. 
According to Laby, there are three consequences to this fiduciary standard that 
originated in the Court (specifically, footnote 11 in Santa Fe): (1) all financial 
advisers are now considered fiduciaries, whereas in the past an adviser’s 
fiduciary status depended on the nature of the relationship with the client; (2) 
the law governing advisers is vaguer than the law banning fraud; and (3) there 
is an issue as to which governing body can change the law now that it is 
established. Id. at 1080–1103. However, given that this federal fiduciary duty 
is now firmly established for advisers, going beyond noting the duty’s 
questionable pedigree is beyond the scope of this article. 
154. See, e.g., Laby, Fiduciary Obligations, supra note 136, at 717 n.94 
(“The principles of loyalty and care espoused in Capital Gains Research Bureau 
are cornerstones of the so-called ‘Prudent Investor Rule,’ . . . .”). 
155. See, e.g., SEC v. Tambone, 550 F.3d 106, 146 (1st Cir. 2008) (“Section 
206 imposes a fiduciary duty on investment advisers to act at all times in the 
best interest of the fund and its investors . . . .”), vacated en banc, 573 F.3d 54 
(1st Cir. 1992). 
156. See SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, Inc., 375 U.S. 180, 192 
(1963) (stating that the IAA showed Congress’s intent to eliminate or expose 
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the litigation against advisers for violating Sections 206(1) and 
(2) of the IAA is a result of advisers not telling their clients about 
such conflicts.157  Advisers also must ensure that the securities 
they recommend are appropriate for each client in terms of the 
client’s financial situation and aspirations.158  This entails 
examining each client’s circumstances and having a reasonable 




A broker-dealer is any person engaged in the business of 
effecting transactions in securities.160  For the duration of that 
transaction, broker-dealers have a fiduciary duty to their clients 
to ensure the transaction is executed.161  But whether a broker-
dealer’s fiduciary duties go beyond the bounds of that 
transaction can be uncertain.162  This is because the relationship 
of broker-dealers to their clients is not always clear.  The IAA 
does not apply to broker-dealers if their performance of advisory 
services is “incidental” to their broker services and if they receive 
 
all conflicts of interest that could motivate an adviser to render non-
disinterested advice). 
157. See, e.g., SEC v. Gabelli, 653 F.3d 49, 52–53, 61 (2d Cir. 2011) 
(granting injunction against advisers who violated the IAA by failing to 
disclose to clients that the advisers allowed one client to engage in “market 
timing,” an advantage not given to the other clients), rev’d on other grounds, 
133 S. Ct. 1216 (2013); Vernazza v. SEC, 327 F.3d 851, 858–59 (9th Cir. 2003) 
(holding advisers violated IAA for failing to disclose to clients the advisers’ own 
interest a certain fund adviser recommended); SEC v. Bolla, 401 F. Supp. 2d 
43, 73 (D.D.C. 2005) (holding that adviser violated IAA for misleading clients 
about the barred status of a co-member of firm). 
158. See Laby, Fiduciary Obligations, supra note 136, at 719 (citing 
Suitability of Investment Advice Provided by Investment Advisers; Custodial 
Account Statements for Certain Advisory Clients, Advisers Act Release No. 
1406, 59 Fed. Reg. 13,464 (Mar. 16, 1994)). 
159. Id. 
160. See 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(4) & (5) (2012). 
161. See Laby, Fiduciary Obligations, supra note 136, at 725 (“Although 
courts impose fiduciary duties on brokers administering non-discretionary 
accounts, those duties last only for the narrow window when the broker is 
executing a transaction.” (citing Limbaugh v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & 
Smith, Inc., 732 F.2d 859, 862 (11th Cir. 1984)). 
162. Id. at 719 (“Fiduciary law governing broker-dealers is more 
ambiguous than the law that governs advisers.”). 
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“no special compensation” for such incidental advising.163  It 
seems to be saying that broker-dealers are not subject to the IAA 
unless they are advisers.  But could this not be said about 
anyone? After all, the IAA does not apply to truck drivers either 
unless they are also financial advisers, but the IAA does not talk 
about truck drivers.  Why does the IAA even mention broker-
dealers?  The answer is found in history. 
Modern computer technology makes selling securities easy, 
but in the 1930s such a transaction was a complex process 
requiring the professional services of brokers and dealers.164 
Brokers bought and sold securities for their clients directly 
through the market.165  Dealers did the same but from the 
dealer’s own account rather than out in the market.166  Because 
a broker dealt with the securities of third parties on behalf of the 
client, the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 imposed the fiduciary 
duty of loyalty onto brokers, but not dealers.167  This duty only 
lasted for the time the broker had custody of the client’s funds.168 
Six years later, Congress enacted the IAA and wanted to 
distinguish advisers from brokers and dealers since the two 
latter were merely “arm’s-length” salesmen, in contrast to 
advisers, who gave investment advice to unsophisticated 
investors on the premise that advisers had special knowledge.169 
Technological advances have reduced the need for professionals 
who exist merely to facilitate securities transactions, thus 
lowering demand for the traditional broker and dealer 
functions.170  These changes forced brokers and dealers to 
market themselves as having advisory skills, so that nowadays 
it is brokerage that is incidental to advice, not the other way 
 
163. 15 U.S.C. § 80b-2(a)(11)(C). 
164. See Nicholas S. Di Lorenzo, Note, Defining a New Punctilio of an 
Honor: The Best Interest Standard for Broker-Dealers, 92 B.U. L. REV. 291, 
307–08 (2012) (describing the complexity of Depression-era trade execution 
and how technological advances have simplified the process). 
165. Id. at 301. 
166. Id. 
167. Id. 
168. See Laby, Fiduciary Obligations, supra note 136, at 721. 
169. See Di Lorenzo, supra note 164, at 301. 
170. See id. at 303; see also id. at 307–08 (explaining that in the 1930s 
and prior, trade execution was a complex process and thus a “vital function” of 
brokerage firms). 
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around.171  The modern approach in determining if a broker-
dealer is a fiduciary is to look at factors such as the client’s 
sophistication, how often the client follows the broker-dealer’s 
advice, and the broker-dealer’s discretion over the client’s 
money.172 
It is arguable that there is evidence of a movement to apply 
the fiduciary duties of financial advisers to all broker-dealers. 
Section 913 of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and 
Consumer Protection Act (Dodd-Frank) directs the SEC to study 
how effective current regulation of broker-dealers is in 
protecting consumers,173 as well as the impact of eliminating the 
broker-dealer exception from the IAA.174  Dodd-Frank 
purportedly gives the SEC authority to establish a fiduciary 
duty applicable to broker-dealers equal to the duty of investment 
advisers.175  In substance though, this authority does not amount 
to anything more than what already existed.  Dodd-Frank only 
permitted the SEC to equalize the standards of broker-dealers 
and investment advisers with regard to broker-dealers who give 
“personalized investment advice.”176  The SEC has suggested 
that it may use its new authority to require such broker-dealers 
to document the basis for their belief that their advice is in the 
client’s best interest.177  But since Dodd-Frank limits the SEC’s 
authority to establishing fiduciary duties for broker-dealers only 
if they advise clients, it is hard to see how this is anything new 
given the fact that broker-dealers who also advise are covered 
under the IAA anyway.178  For now, broker-dealers can avoid the 
 
171. See Laby, Fiduciary Obligations, supra note 136, at 737. 
172. See id. at 723 (noting that whether an account is discretionary is 
usually determinative). 
173. 15 U.S.C. § 78o note (2012); H.R. 4173 § 913(b)(1) (2010). 
174. 15 U.S.C. § 78o note; H.R. 4173 § 913(c)(10). 
175. 15 U.S.C. § 78o note; H.R. 4173 § 913(g). 
176. See supra note 175. 
177. See INVESTOR ADVISORY COMMITTEE, SEC, DRAFT RECOMMENDATION 
OF THE INVESTOR AS PURCHASER SUBCOMMITTEE: BROKER-DEALER FIDUCIARY 
DUTY 8 (2013), available at https://www.sec.gov/spotlight/investor-advisory-
committee-2012/fiduciary-duty-recommendation.pdf. 
178. See, e.g., Donald C. Langevoort, Psychological Perspectives on the 
Fiduciary Business, 91 B.U. L. REV. 995, 996 (2011) (“[Dodd-Frank] insists on 
conjoining the fiduciary responsibilities of brokers and advisers, but then 
explicitly sets forth limitations on SEC rulemaking relating to the sale of 
proprietary products and continuing duties of care, clearly showing Congress 
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fiduciary duties of advisers by refraining from giving 
personalized advice.179 
 
C.  How Legislation May Alter Fiduciary Duties 
 
Dodd-Frank and the IAA are not the only examples of 
legislation affecting fiduciary duties.  Other examples are 
Connecticut’s code specifically allowing the state treasurer to 
engage in SRI with respect to the state’s trust funds,180 as well 
as state-specific trustee duties.181 Though not legislation, codes 
of ethics governing the relationship between attorneys and 
clients also affect fiduciary duties.182  Probably the most relevant 
statute in terms of breadth of applicability is the Employee 
Retirement and Income Security Act (“ERISA”).183  The purpose 
of ERISA is to protect beneficiaries of private pension plans.184 
ERISA imposes a prudent-man standard of care on trustees of 
such pension plans, requiring them to manage the plan “solely” 
in the interest of its beneficiaries.185  The ERISA duties are 
among “the highest known to the law.”186  Pension-fund 
 
expected something short of true fiduciary responsibility.”). 
179. See INVESTOR ADVISORY COMMITTEE, supra note 177, at 6 (“[Broker-
dealers] who wish to avoid regulation under the Advisers Act could do so by 
limiting themselves to transaction-specific recommendations while avoiding 
holding themselves out as advisers or as providing advisory services.”). 
180. CONN. GEN. STAT. § 3-13d(a) (2014) (“Among the factors to be 
considered by the Treasurer with respect to all securities may be the social, 
economic and environmental implications of investments of trust funds in 
particular securities or types of securities.”). 
181. See generally John Langbein, Why Did Trust Law Become Statute 
Law in the United States?, 58 ALA. L. REV. 1069 (2007) (explaining how the 
development of the trust from a land-transfer tool into a wealth-management 
device prompted development in trust law to move from common law to 
statutory, such as the Uniform Trust Code). 
182. See supra note 107 and accompanying text. 
183. Employee Retirement Income Security Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001–1461 
(2012). 
184. See id. §§ 1001a(c)(3), 1001b(c)(3). ERISA does not apply to 
government-employee pension plans. Id. § 1003(b)(1). As of the end of 2011, 
private U.S. retirement plan assets totaled about $13.5 trillion. See FAQs 
About Benefits—Retirement Issues, EMPLOYEE BENEFIT RESEARCH INST., 
http://www.ebri.org/publications/benfaq/index.cfm?fa=retfaq4 (last visited 
Mar. 24, 2014). 
185. 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a). 
186. Gary J. Caine, FSA, ERISA Fiduciary Responsibility: Fiduciary 
30http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol35/iss2/2
 2014 RESOLVING THE CONFLICT 565 
fiduciaries must either perform their duties to the standard of 
an informed investor (not a layman),187 or hire someone who 
can.188 
This “exclusive benefit rule” of ERISA—so called because of 
the requirement that pension-fund trustees operate “solely” in 
the interest of plan beneficiaries189—has been criticized. 
Professors Fischel and Langbein point out the fact that unlike 
with normal trusts where there is a clear distinction between 
settlor and beneficiaries, in employee-pension trusts both the 
employee and employer can be considered settlors and 
beneficiaries.190  This is because often they both pay into the 
fund and both benefit from it in the form of tax advantages.191 
Providing for the sole benefit of beneficiaries is further 
complicated by the fact that there is often a conflict of interest 
between younger and older workers since the plan benefits older 
workers more than the younger ones in the present, and ERISA 
gives no guidance on how to deal with this.192 
Despite its flaws, most seem to agree—and it stands to 
reason—that the exclusive-benefit rule forecloses any 
opportunity for SRI since pension funds must be managed only 
in the interests of beneficiaries, not in the interest of society at 
large.193  This holds true even if the trust instrument provides 
 
Reliance on Registered Investment Advisors, at 1, available at 
http://multnomahgroup.com/pages/wp-content/uploads/2012/02/White-Paper-
Fiduciary-Reliance-on-RIAs.pdf (last visited May 22, 2015) (quoting Donovan 
v. Bierwirth, 680 F.2d 263, 272 n.8 (2d Cir. 1982)). 
187. 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(1)(B). 
188. See Caine, supra note 186, at 1 (citing DOL Reg. § 2509.95-1(c)(6)); 
see also supra note 141 and accompanying text (regarding the Prudent Investor 
Rule’s standard for delegation of trustee duties). 
189. See supra note 185; infra note 193. 
190. Daniel Fischel & John H. Langbein, ERISA’s Fundamental 
Contradiction: The Exclusive Benefit Rule, 55 U. CHI. L. REV. 1105, 1117–18 
(1988). 
191. See id. 
192. See id. at 1120 n.60. 
193. See id. at 1147 (“A principal reason most of the pressures for social 
investing in recent years have been directed at ERISA-exempt funds, such as 
state and local pension plans and university and other charitable endowments, 
is that . . . the perception has been that the exclusive benefit rule forecloses the 
issue.”); see also 29 C.F.R. § 2509.08-1 (2015) (“ERISA’s fiduciary standards 
expressed in sections 403 and 404 do not permit fiduciaries to select 
investments based on factors outside the economic interests of the plan until 
they have concluded, based on economic factors, that alternative investments 
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otherwise.194  Though the U.S. Department of Labor (“DOL”), in 
a letter to Calvert Investments, Inc., said that ERISA fiduciaries 
may engage in SRI, the DOL qualified this by stating that an 
investment under ERISA made on the basis of non-economic 
factors is permissible only if that investment, “when judged 
solely on the basis of its economic value, would be equal or 
superior to alternative available investments.”195  This 
statement cannot be read to mean the DOL construes ERISA to 
permit SRI.  Rather, it means the opposite.  Obviously, an 
investment that is superior to all others—or not inferior to any 
others—based on economic factors would not put a trustee in 
danger of violating fiduciary duties.  What the DOL is really 
saying here is that trustees of ERISA plans must place economic 
criteria above all other factors when making investment 
decisions. 
However, SRI may be permissible in an ERISA plan where 
the plan provides participants with individual accounts and 
those participants exercise control over the assets in those 
accounts.196  In such an instance, ERISA does not consider the 
participant or trustee to be fiduciaries; therefore, ERISA’s 
fiduciary duties would not apply to them.197  Statutes like ERISA 
might make it easy to determine if SRI is allowed, but what 
about where legislation is silent? 
 
are equal.”). Moreover, Congress rejected several proposed ERISA provisions 
designed to encourage SRI. See Hutchinson & Cole, supra note 15, at 1365. But 
see Ronald B. Ravikoff & Myron P. Curzan, Social Responsibility in Investment 
Policy and the Prudent Man Rule, 68 CALIF. L. REV. 518, 531–36 (1980) 
(arguing for a broad reading of ERISA that allows for trustees to “incorporate 
nontraditional objectives” into investment decision making). 
194. 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(1)(D) (stating that the trustee must act according 
to the “documents and instruments governing the plan insofar as such 
documents and instruments are consistent with [the statute].”). 
195. Letter from Robert J. Doyle, Director, Office of Regulations & 
Interpretations, U.S. Department of Labor, to William M. Tartikoff, Senior 
Vice President and General Counsel, Calvert Group Ltd. (May 28, 1998), 
available at http://www.dol.gov/ebsa/programs/ori/advisory98/98-04a.htm.  See 
also Interpretive Bulletin Relating to Investing in Economically Targeted 
Investments, 73 Fed. Reg. 61,734 (Oct. 17, 2008) (“[B]efore selecting an [ETI], 
fiduciaries must have first concluded that the alternative options are truly 
equal.”). 
196. 29 U.S.C. § 1104(c)(1)(A). 
197. Id. § 1104(c)(1)(A)(i)–(ii). 29 C.F.R. § 2550.404C-1 describes the 
conditions where this ERISA exemption exists. 
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D. The Effect of Fiduciary Duties on SRI 
 
Without a statute specifically allowing or mandating SRI, 
legal scholars had generally been of the view that SRI violates a 
fiduciary’s duties.198  However, in 2005 the United Nations 
Environment Program Finance Initiative199 commissioned the 
law firm of Freshfields Bruckhaus Deringer to determine 
whether the law prohibits, permits, or requires SRI.200  The 
Freshfields report said that SRI is necessary in two situations: 
when social factors materially impact the financial performance 
of an investment, or when there is a consensus among the fund’s 
beneficiaries that social factors should have weight in 
investment decisions.201  Further, trustees may use SRI as a tie-
breaker when all other criteria involved in an investment 
decision are equal.202  Many consider this report to have settled 
the issue of whether SRI conflicts with fiduciary duties.203  But 
 
198. See Joakim Sandberg, Socially Responsible Investment and 
Fiduciary Duty: Putting the Freshfields Report into Perspective, 101 J. BUS. 
ETHICS 143, 144 (2011). 
199. The “UNEP FI is a global partnership between UNEP and the 
financial sector.” UNEP FINANCE INITIATIVE, www.unepfi.org (last visited Dec. 
13, 2013). The UNEP was established in 1972 and “is the voice for the 
environment within the United Nations system. UNEP acts as a catalyst, 
advocate, educator and facilitator to promote the wise use and sustainable 
development of the global environment.” About, UNEP FINANCE INITIATIVE, 
www.unep.org/About/ (last visited Dec. 8, 2013). 
200. UNEP FINANCE INITIATIVE, A LEGAL FRAMEWORK FOR THE  
INTEGRATION OF ENVIRONMENTAL, SOCIAL AND GOVERNANCE ISSUES INTO 
INSTITUTIONAL INVESTMENT 6 (2005), available at http://www.unepfi.org/ 
fileadmin/documents/freshfields_legalresp_20051123.pdf. 
201. Id. at 14. 
202. Id. 
203. See e.g., Sandberg, supra note 198, at 144 (stating that whether 
fiduciary duties allow for SRI is “an issue largely considered to be settled by 
the Freshfields report.”). Professor James Hawley of St. Mary’s College of 
California said this about the Freshfields report: “[I]t essentially flip-flops the 
conventional wisdom on fiduciary duty, completely turning it on its head . . . 
[and] the fact that this report was prepared by Freshfields—the third largest 
firm in the world, well known as a corporate fiduciary firm—carries huge 
clout.” William Baue, Fiduciary Duties Redefined to Allow (and Sometimes 
Require) Environmental, Social and Governance Considerations, SUSTAINABLE 
INV. NEWS (Nov. 3, 2005), 
http://dev.socialfunds.com/news/article.cgi/article1851.html. However, turning 
centuries’ worth of wisdom on its head does not necessarily result in greater 
wisdom, and while the fact that Freshfields is a large firm may render its 
report influential, it does not make it correct. 
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the truth is that Freshfields’s conclusions were based on a 
misunderstanding of SRI and a misreading of case law. 
First, as said above, an investment made on the basis of 
financial concerns is not SRI.204  Therefore, when Freshfields 
said that a fiduciary must perform SRI when social factors affect 
the investment’s financial performance, Freshfields was not 
actually talking about SRI at all.  Second, Freshfields’s notion of 
consensus among beneficiaries is unrealistic.  Social issues tend 
to be controversial, and it would be nearly impossible for all 
beneficiaries to agree with each other on any of them.205 
Freshfields acknowledged this difficulty206 and suggested that 
fiduciaries can look to “clear breaches of widely recognized 
norms” in lieu of proof of consensus.207  But such norms have 
nothing to do with beneficiary consensus, and this solution 
merely raises the question of how these norms can be 
recognized.208  Finally, the idea that SRI could be a tie-breaker 
when investment options are otherwise equal is also a fantasy. 
As Professor Joakim Sandberg has argued, it is almost 
impossible for two options to be indistinguishable.209  If options 
do appear to be identical, then this is probably an indication that 
more research is necessary to discover differences.210  And in the 
event that there are two equal choices, a prudent investor would 
likely invest in both to mitigate hidden risk.211 
Though Freshfields cites cases in support of its thesis that 
SRI is not in conflict with fiduciary duties, Freshfields’s 
 
204. Supra Part I.A. 
205. See, e.g., Sandberg, supra note 198, at 153 (“[I]t is extremely unlikely 
that there is a single [SRI] issue on which all beneficiaries can agree.”). 
206. UNEP FINANCE INITIATIVE, supra note 200, at 12 (“There are clear 
practical difficulties involved in identifying such a consensus by empirical 
means.”). 
207. Id. See also id. at 96. 
208. Freshfields gave “conventions on the elimination of child labor” as an 
example of how to determine a widely recognized norm, id., but not only does 
such a convention have nothing to do with beneficiary consensus, it is absurd 
to suggest that a resolution from an international convention means there can 
be no disagreement on the resolution’s conclusion, especially since if there 
actually were no disagreement then there would not have been a need for the 
resolution. 
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interpretation of those cases is contrived.  Freshfields cites 
Withers v. Teachers’ Retirement System of the City of New York212 
for the proposition that trustees can make “imprudent” 
investments as long as they are in the long-term best interests 
of the beneficiaries.213  But Withers does not hold that bad 
investment decisions are actually good if they are in the 
beneficiaries’ long-term interests, and the case certainly does 
SRI proponents no favors.  In Withers, pension-fund trustees 
invested in city bonds for the purpose of preventing the city’s 
bankruptcy.214  The city was the main source of the fund’s 
income, and its bankruptcy would have rendered the fund 
insolvent within a decade.215  The plaintiffs alleged the trustees 
breached their fiduciary duty by investing in these 
unmarketable bonds,216 but the court found that since the 
trustees had “firm grounds for believing” the bond investments 
were the only means of preventing exhaustion of the fund’s 
assets, their decision to invest in those bonds was prudent.217 
This is a far cry from, for example, CalPERS making an 
investment in green energy with the expectation that climate 
change could reduce global GDP by twenty percent in the next 
thirty-five years.218  Consider the drastic difference: In Withers, 
there was a direct and easily discernible connection between the 
investment in city bonds and the survival of the pension fund, 
whereas investing in a company based on the financial effect of 
its environmental policy requires two elements which are nearly 
impossible to obtain.  First, that company’s policy must have a 
demonstrable effect on the condition of the environment; and 
second, that effect must itself have a demonstrable effect on that 
same company’s financial performance.219  Otherwise, the notion 
 
212. 447 F. Supp. 1248 (S.D.N.Y. 1978). 
213. UNEP FINANCE INITIATIVE, supra note 200, at 96; see also id. at 112 
n.460 (“[Withers] supports the view that [SRI] considerations can be taken into 
account in assessing the likely implications and consequences of an 
investment.”). 
214. Withers, 447 F. Supp. at 1250. 
215. Id. at 1251–52. 
216. Id. at 1254. 
217. Id. at 1259. 
218. See, e.g., supra note 60. 
219. To see why this would be almost impossible to prove, consider first 
how long it can take for a company’s behavior to cause an observable change 
in the environment. Second, even if there were such a change, how could its 
35
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that such an investment is based on financial return is rooted in 
nothing but dreams. 
Only one of the cases Freshfields cited has anything to do 
with SRI: Board of Trustees v. Mayor of Baltimore City.220  This 
illuminates perhaps the main reason for the lack of legal 
analysis in nearly all commentary about the relationship 
between SRI and fiduciary duties: There is almost no case law 
on it.221  And rather than supporting Freshfields’s thesis, Board 
of Trustees is a striking example of the conflict between fiduciary 
duties and SRI.  During the American uproar over South African 
apartheid,222 the city of Baltimore enacted an ordinance 
requiring city-employee pensions to divest holdings in 
companies doing business in South Africa and stipulated that 
those companies would be determined by a list created by a 
private organization.223  Pension-fund trustees sued the city, 
 
cause be traced to any particular company when there are so many companies 
whose environmental effects can spread across vast distances? Third, even if 
such a change could be traced to a specific company’s behavior, how could this 
change’s effect on that company’s financial performance possibly be measured? 
See, e.g., Hutchinson & Cole, supra note 15, at 1369 (stating that the argument 
that a stronger local economy or freer society will benefit pension-plan 
participants is a “tenuous link,” making it difficult to determine whether the 
purpose of the investment was to benefit the participants or to achieve some 
other purpose). However, there are others besides CalPERS and Freshfields 
that would claim the link between climate change and a company’s finances is 
not too tenuous for a fiduciary’s consideration. For example, Bill McKibben 
argues that fossil-fuel companies have “five times as much oil and coal and gas 
on the books as climate scientists think is safe to burn.” Bill McKibben, Global 
Warming’s Terrifying New Math, ROLLING STONE (July 19, 2012), 
http://www.rollingstone.com/politics/news/global-warmings-terrifying-new-
math-20120719. Since this inventory is accounted for in the value of the 
companies’ stocks, if the government were to prevent the excess fuel from being 
burned, the value of those stocks would drop. Id. But even if government took 
such action, it would not be accurate to say the reduction in the companies’ 
values resulted from climate change; rather, governmental action would be the 
cause. 
220. 562 A.2d 720 (Md. 1989). 
221. See, e.g., Richardson, supra note 20, at 271 (stating that there is little 
U.S. case law on SRI because SRI “hardly challenges the economic values that 
underpin fiduciary norms”). 
222. See, e.g., supra Part I(B). 
223. Bd. of Trs., 562 A.2d at 724.  Specifically, the statute said the 
companies would be identified by reference to the annual report of the Africa 
Fund.  Id. The trustees challenged this list in court, arguing that it 
impermissibly delegated legislative power to the Africa Fund.  Id. at 730. The 
court got around this by holding that the list was merely a reference, but the 
36http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol35/iss2/2
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arguing that the ordinance prevented them from fulfilling the 
city’s duty to prudently manage the plan.224  The court held the 
ordinance did not force the trustees to violate their duties, 
though the court had to twist its rationale around the rock-solid 
fact that the ordinance prevented the trustees from optimizing 
investments.  For example, the court said the ordinance would 
not jeopardize the amount of payment to beneficiaries of the 
fund.225  However, this is false since the ordinance banned 
investments in many large companies.226  The court also 
discounted the trustees’ argument that considering social factors 
unrelated to investment performance altered their duty of 
prudence, though the court cited no actual law in support of its 
holding.227 
 
ordinance stated that the companies doing business in or with South Africa 
“shall be identified by reference . . .” to the list.  Id. (emphasis added).  See also 
Garrett M. Smith, Board of Trustees v. City of Baltimore: Public Pension Fund 
Divestment of South African Securities Upheld, 49 MD. L. REV. 1030, 1040–41 
(1990) (stating that the court failed to determine if the list was in fact non-
binding and instead merely said it should construe the ordinance so as to be 
unconstitutional). Though the issue of the list has nothing to do with SRI, it is 
one more example of the opinion’s addled rationale and a hint that this holding 
was driven by a search for particular results rather than adherence to the law. 
224. Bd. of Trs., 562 A.2d at 733–35. The court and parties termed the 
city’s duties contractual, not fiduciary. Thus, the trustees argued that the 
ordinance “unconstitutionally impairs contractual obligations. . . ..” Id. at 733. 
However, the court and parties agreed that these contractual duties included 
the common-law fiduciary duties of prudence and loyalty.  Id. at 734.  The 
trustees argued that the ordinance altered their duty of prudence “by radically 
reducing the universe of eligible investments.”  Id. at 735. 
225. Id. (“[D]ivestiture does not imprudently increase risk or decrease 
income.”). 
226. Id. (“While the Ordinances seem to ban investments in many larger 
companies with a high market capitalization, numerous opportunities remain 
available.”). 
227. The court cited 3 AUSTIN WAKEMAN SCOTT & WILLIAM FRANKLIN 
FRATCHER, THE LAW OF TRUSTS § 227.17 (4th ed. 1988) for the proposition that 
trustees do not need to get maximum return and can perform SRI. Bd. of Trs., 
562 A.2d at 736.  Though this treatise does in fact say just that—“Trustees in 
deciding whether to invest in, or to retain, the securities of a corporation may 
properly consider the social performance of the corporation”—it cites no law in 
support of its argument. SCOTT & FRATCHER § 227.17.  Rather, it merely 
analogizes a trustee’s duties to a corporation’s ability to contribute to charity.  
Id.  Furthermore, the succeeding edition of that treatise recanted its claim that 
SRI is permissible without authorization in the trust instrument. See 4 AUSTIN 
WAKEMAN SCOTT, WILLIAM FRANKLIN FRATCHER, & MARK L. ASCHER, SCOTT ON 
TRUSTS § 19.1.13 (5th ed. 2007). 
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In sum, a close reading of the cases Freshfields cited to 
support its conclusion that SRI does not violate fiduciary duties 
shows that the opposite is the truth.  Trustees cannot lawfully 
engage in SRI because their fiduciary duty of care, which holds 
them to the Prudent Investor Rule,228 and their fiduciary duty of 
loyalty, which requires them to invest only for the benefit of the 
beneficiaries, both prevent SRI.229  Advisers and broker-dealers 
acting as advisers cannot engage in SRI because of their 
fiduciary duty to act in the best interest of the client and to 
ensure appropriateness.230  But, as shown above,231 fiduciary 
duties are contractual in nature and subject to agreement. 
Therefore, SRI will not violate fiduciary duties as long as the 
settlor stipulates it or the parties agree to it.  They can do this 
through the doctrine of authorization.  In some instances, 
ratification or exculpation clauses also allow SRI. 
 
IV. Lawful Methods of Performing SRI 
 
Trust law has two doctrines that can allow the trustee to 
engage in SRI: authorization and ratification.232  Additionally, 
exculpation clauses in a trust document or contract may permit 
SRI.  Authorization occurs when the trust instrument explicitly 
allows the trustee to engage in specific behavior.233  Ratification 
occurs when trust beneficiaries consent to the trustee’s act or 
omission, thus rendering the trustee not liable.234  Exculpation 
clauses are provisions in trusts or contracts that eliminate a 
trustee’s or adviser’s liability for certain behavior.235  Given the 
contractual nature of fiduciary duties,236 advisers and broker-
dealers who advise can integrate the principle of authorization 
 
228. See supra Part III.B.1. 
229. See id. 
230. See supra Part III.B.2. 
231. Supra Part III.A. 
232. See, e.g., Langbein & Posner, supra note 9, at 104–05 (“[T]rust law 
contains two doctrines, authorization and ratification, that permit the settlor 
and the beneficiary respectively to waive the ordinarily applicable law and 
thus to excuse the trustee from what would otherwise be a breach of trust.”). 
233. See infra Part IV.A. 
234. See infra Part IV.B. 
235. See infra Part IV.C. 
236. See supra Part III.A. 
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into their contracts with clients to allow SRI.  However, they 
cannot rely on ratification and should be wary of exculpation 




It is the trust instrument itself that determines the trustee’s 
duties and powers.238  As long as the provision in the trust is 
explicit, it can permit trustees to engage in behavior that would 
otherwise violate their fiduciary duties.239  An examination of 
cases demonstrates that SRI is among the behaviors that the 
trust instrument can authorize.240  In United Mine Workers of 
America v. Robinson,241 a collective-bargaining agreement 
increased benefits for widows whose husbands were receiving 
pensions when they died but not for widows whose husbands 
died before they retired.242  The plaintiffs argued that the 
distinction between widows whose husbands were receiving 
pensions at death and those who were not had no rational 
relationship to the trust and was therefore illegal.243  The trial 
court agreed, but the Supreme Court held that because the 
terms of the trust stated that the trustees must enforce benefit 
levels established in the collective bargaining agreement, 
whether or not such a distinction was reasonable was 
irrelevant.244  In contrast, the court in Rodriguez-Abreu v. Chase 
Manhattan Bank, N.A.245 held that since the terms of the 
pension plan did not specifically allow the administrator 
 
237. See infra note 282 and accompanying text. 
238. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 76(1) (2007) (“The trustee has 
a duty to administer the trust . . . in accordance with the terms of the trust . . 
. .”); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 164(a) (1959). 
239. See supra notes 117–127. 
240. See, e.g., Richardson, supra note 47, at 168 (stating that if a trust 
instrument “expressly requires the trustee” to implement SRI, then the trustee 
must do so). 
241. 455 U.S. 562 (1982). 
242. Id. at 564. 
243. Id. at 568. 
244. Id. at 573–74 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 164). See 
also id. at 575 (“As long as such conditions do not violate federal law or policy, 
they are entitled to the same respect as any other provision in a collective-
bargaining agreement.”). 
245. 986 F.2d 580, 584 (1st Cir. 1993). 
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discretion to review claims, such discretion did not exist.246 
Case law thus shows that trust provisions are enforceable 
as long as they do not authorize otherwise illegal activity or 
behavior that violates public policy.  This is the fundamental 
principle of authorization derived from case law, and this 
principle allows for SRI when SRI is not otherwise illegal—such 
as under ERISA247—or against public policy.  Since fiduciary 
duties are contractual, investment advisers and broker-dealers 
who advise can use authorization in a similar manner.  They 
need to ensure that clients who want their investments screened 
according to social criteria explicitly agree to this in their 
contracts.  Advisers must fully disclose to their clients the risks 
of SRI.248  Such disclosure is likely satisfied by a detailed 
description in the fund’s prospectus or offering memorandum of 
how SRI applies to that fund and the risks it poses to the 
investor.  Once disclosed, clients are free to impose whatever 
screening conditions they want on their investments as long as 




Even if certain trustee behavior is not authorized, trustees 
are not legally liable for such behavior if the beneficiaries 
consented to it before or at the time it was done.249   However, a 
beneficiary’s mere failure to object is not consent;250 beneficiaries 
 
246. See Sinai Hosp. of Balt., Inc. v. Nat’l Benefit Fund for Hosp. & Health 
Care Emps., 697 F.2d 562, 567 (4th Cir. 1982) (“[C]ontracting parties . . . cannot 
control expenditures from funds already vested in a trust entity where the 
trust instrument reposes that authority solely with the trustees.”); Thompson 
v. Trs. of Phillips Exeter Acad., 196 A.2d 42 (N.H. 1963) (stating that a trustee 
must administer a trust according to its terms and is not relieved of liability 
for failing to do so even if such failure resulted from a good-faith interpretation 
of those terms). 
247. See supra Part III.C. 
248. See supra note 156 and accompanying text. Included among such 
risks would be the possible harm to the fund resulting from SRI’s mitigation of 
diversification or preclusion from investing in certain businesses. See, e.g., 
supra Part II. 
249. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 78 cmt. c(3) (2007); 
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 216(1) (1959) (“[A] beneficiary cannot hold 
the trustee liable for an act or omission of the trustee as a breach of trust if the 
beneficiary prior to or at the time of the act or omission consented to it.”). 
250. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 216 cmt. a (1959). 
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can retract consent before the deviant behavior;251 and if there 
are several beneficiaries, all of them must consent before the 
trustee’s liability is removed.252   For such ratification to be valid, 
the ratifying beneficiaries should be aware of all material facts 
involved in the acts they ratify and of their rights in the matter, 
and must not be prevented from exercising those rights.253  
Advisers and broker-dealers cannot use ratification since there 
is no analogous doctrine in contract law.254 
In Marcucci v. Hardy,255 the plaintiff put his daughter’s 
name on his bank account so she could control his money in his 
old age.256  The plaintiff sued his daughter after she used this 
money to lend $150,000 to neighbors who were in serious 
financial difficulty,257 arguing the loan violated the prudent-man 
standard.258  But the court did not even consider whether the 
trustee violated this standard.259  Rather, since the plaintiff had 
actively encouraged the loan260 and knew that the neighbors 
were on the brink of losing their home,261 the court found that 
the father had ratified his daughter’s loan, and therefore, there 
was no breach of duty.262 
United States v. Henshaw263 is a case of a defendant’s failed 
 
251. See id. § 216 cmt. c. 
252. See id. § 216 cmt. g. 
253. See e.g., In re Estate of Lange, 383 A.2d 1130, 1137-38 (N.J. 1978) 
(stating that a trust beneficiary may ratify a trustee’s breach of duty and be 
precluded from suing if ratification was made with “full knowledge of all the 
material particulars and circumstances, and . . .  [the beneficiary was] fully 
apprised of the effect of the acts ratified, and of his or her legal rights in the 
matter.”). 
254. See JOSEPH M. PERILLO, CALAMARI AND PERILLO ON CONTRACTS § 
5.14(a), at 209 (6th ed. 2009) (stating that parties must give consideration to 
modify an existing contract). 
255. 65 F.3d 986 (1st Cir. 1995). 
256. Id. at 988. 
257. Id. 
258. Id. at 992. 
259. Id.  (“We need not consider whether [defendant] violated the ‘prudent 
man’ standard, because . . . [plaintiff] actively encouraged the $150,000 loan to 
the [neighbors].”) 
260. Id.  See also id. at 988 (stating that neighbors had cared for plaintiff 
for eighteen months while defendant was away on military duty, perhaps 
helping explain why plaintiff encouraged the loan). 
261. Id. at 993. 
262. Id. 
263. 388 F.3d 738 (10th Cir. 2004). 
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attempt to use ratification as a defense.  The defendant was an 
attorney representing a client in bankruptcy.264  The client had 
established a debtor-in-possession account (DIPA), and the court 
ordered him to open a separate account to hold proceeds of sales 
of his property subject to federal-tax liens.265  In violation of a 
court order, the client put funds from the property account into 
the DIPA.266  Then, the defendant asked his client to pay his 
legal fees out of the DIPA even though the client could not 
withdraw from the fund without the court’s approval.267  The 
court ordered the defendant to pay back the money.268  The 
defendant argued that the court’s failure to respond to the 
bankrupt’s earlier illegal transfers from the property account 
into the DIPA meant that the court ratified later violations.269  
However, the court said that ratification only applies when the 
beneficiary knows all material facts.270  The court did not know 
all the material facts here because, for example, it did not know 
of the bankrupt’s latest illegitimate transfers from which the 
defendant’s fees were paid.271 
Under ratification, trustees who engage in SRI could not be 
held liable for breaching their fiduciary duties if all the 
beneficiaries to the trust were aware of the SRI and consented 
to it.  Consent cannot consist of a mere lack of objection, as in 
Henshaw, but rather there must be some affirmative 
manifestation of consent on the part of the beneficiaries, as in 
Marcucci.  Unlike trustees, advisers and broker-dealers do not 
have the benefit of ratification.  This is because advisers and 
broker-dealers operate under contracts rather than trust 
instruments, and contract law has no doctrine similar to 
ratification in trust law.272  Rather, most jurisdictions apply the 
pre-existing duty rule to contract modification.273  This rule 
 




268. Id. at 741. 
269. Id. (“[Defendant] . . . attempts to invoke the notion of ratification to 
undercut the Government’s effort to reclaim its property.”). 
270. Id. at 742. 
271. Id. 
272. See PERILLO, supra note 254. 
273. See id. 
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mandates that valid contracts cannot be modified without 
consideration.274  Applying the rule to a contract between an 
adviser and client, if that contract does not allow the adviser to 
perform SRI, then the adviser simply cannot perform SRI unless 
the adviser and client amend the contract or make a new one.  
Therefore, advisers and broker-dealers should be sure to provide 
for SRI in their contracts before engaging in it.  After all, if they 
cannot obtain permission for SRI in the contract, this means the 
client does not want SRI. 
 
C. Exculpation Clauses 
 
As the Second Restatement says, exculpation clauses cannot 
relieve trustees of their fiduciary duties if such clauses merely 
provide a general statement as to what the trustee is not liable 
for.275  However, courts have enforced exculpation clauses that 
state exactly what type of otherwise duty-breaching behavior 
will not render a trustee liable. In Perling v. Citizens & Southern 
National Bank,276 trust beneficiaries alleged that the trustees 
breached their duty of care by keeping in the trust stocks that 
fell drastically in value.  The trustees argued that the trust had 
a clause allowing them to hold stock and relieving them of 
liability unless they acted in bad faith.277  The court held that 
the provision did indeed absolve the trustees of liability for 
holding the stocks because it explicitly stated that it would.278  
In contrast, the court in Jewett v. Capital National Bank279 held 
that there was a question of fact as to whether a clause relieving 
the trustee of liability for speculative investments also relieved 
the trustee from liability for doing nothing.  The underlying 
principle governing whether or not courts uphold an exculpatory 
clause is that such a clause is valid as long as it is specific with 
 
274. See id. 
275. See supra notes 117–127 and accompanying text. 
276. 300 S.E.2d 649, 674 (Ga. 1983). 
277. Id. at 675.  The clause stated “any investment retained by the 
Trustee in good faith shall be proper.” Id. 
278. Id. at 677 (“An examination of the cases . . . shows the result in a 
given case is controlled by the language of the instrument as construed under 
particular state laws and general trust principles.”).  Note, however, that this 
case was decided before the Georgia prudent-man statute was enacted. 
279. 618 S.W.2d 109, 112 (Tex. App. 1981). 
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regard to the permitted behavior.280  For example, an 
exculpation clause relieving a fiduciary from its general duty of 
care would not be valid.  But a clause relieving a fiduciary from 
liability for loss resulting from SRI would be upheld because it 
unambiguously applies to specific behavior—engaging in SRI. 
Practically speaking, exculpation clauses are little different 
from authorization.281  Using either will relieve the fiduciary 
from liability for SRI as long as the trust instrument or contract 
leaves no room to doubt that SRI was contemplated by the 
settlor or agreed to by the client. However, advisers and broker-
dealers who advise should consider the SEC’s warning that 
exculpatory clauses may violate the anti-fraud provisions of the 
IAA if such provisions are likely to make clients believe they 
have waived rights of action against the adviser for gross 
negligence or willful misfeasance.282  The bottom line is this: 
Fiduciaries should not perform SRI unless the source of their 
duties and obligations—be it a trust or contract—explicitly 




Socially responsible investing has existed for centuries, and 
its popularity has increased in the past few decades.  The 
motivation of many who practice SRI has moved from striving to 
adhere to one’s moral code to a grander notion of changing the 
behavior of others.  While economics and statistics indicate that 
SRI has little influence over society at large, it remains valuable 
 
280. See, e.g., Hanson v. Minette, 461 N.W.2d 592, 597–98 (Iowa 1990) 
(holding exculpatory clause explicitly relieving trustee from liability for loss 
resulting for error of judgment valid to relieve trustee from liability for loss 
due to negligence); Neuhaus v. Richards, 846 S.W.2d 70, 75–76 (Tex. App. 
1992) (holding exculpatory clauses may allow trustees to retain unproductive 
assets as long as such permission is explicit), vacated, 871 S.W.2d 182 (Tex. 
1994); Westview Invs., Ltd. v. U.S. Bank Nat. Ass’n, 138 P.3d 638, 644 (Wash. 
Ct. App. 2006) (holding exculpatory clause explicitly precluding fiduciary and 
tort liability valid). 
281. See supra Part IV.A. 
282. See Letter from Kenneth C. Fang, Senior Counsel, SEC, to Heitman 
Capital Managerment, LLC (Feb. 12, 2007), available at 
http://www.sec.gov/divisions/investment/noaction/2007/heitman021207.pdf.  
To determine if an exculpatory clause violates the IAA, the SEC will account 
for “all of the surrounding facts and circumstances.”  Id. at 4. 
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for those who merely want to avoid funding or profiting from 
activities they consider immoral or socially harmful.  Though 
fiduciary duties stand in the way of SRI by default, the doctrines 
of authorization and ratification, as well as exculpation clauses, 
can allow trustees to practice SRI.  Moreover, the contractual 
nature of fiduciary duties makes authorization applicable to 
investment advisers and broker-dealers acting as advisers. 
Authorization allows SRI for trustees when the trust instrument 
explicitly permits it and for advisers when SRI is clearly 
provided for in their contract with the client.  Ratification and 
exculpation clauses can relieve trustees from liability for SRI. 
Beneath all the history, law, and rhetoric lies one simple 
principle: Those entrusted with managing other people’s money 
must remember whose money it is and act accordingly. 
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